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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMPOSING INCREASED




EXTRAORDINARY growth in suburban population is creating complex physical,
social, and fiscal problems.' Although these problems have been cast upon
an archaic structure of local government which often impedes their efficient
and equitable solution, answers to the problems cannot be deferred until the
structure of local government is modernized. Nor are the affected sub-
urban communities all alike; they include "employing," "mixed," and "resi-
dential" centers, and range from old, established, higher income municipalities
to sparsely settled, unincorporated areas of still uncertain character.2 In spite
of their differences, most of these communities have the common problem of
providing necessary capital facilities and service levels for newcomers without
imposing extraordinary revenue burdens on present residents.
Local governments already'raise and spend vast sums of money. In 1952,
municipalities spent'about 8.4 billion dollars to support such functions as pro-
tection of persons, transportation, education, sanitation, welfare, and recre-
ation.3 The 1961 bill was 16.5 billion dollars. 4 Of the 1961 total local revenue
of 15.8 billion dollars over 47 percent came from local taxes, 37 percent from
charges for utilities and other local sources. Less than 16 percent came from
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Yale University, 1963-64.
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1. The 1960 urban population of the United States was 125.3 million, an increase
of 29% over 1950's 96.8 million. Of the urban population, 112.8 million resided within
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, (SMA's), areas in and nearby central cities,
58 million lived within the central cities, and the balance of 54.8 million lived outside them.
During 1950-1960 the central cities grew some 10.8% in population. This growth
was concentrated in a small number of Southern and Western cities. Much of it resulted
from annexation. Most central cities lost population. During the same 10 years in areas
within SMA's but outside of central cities there was a 48.5% increase in population.
See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1963;
THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 1963.
These statistics indicate immense present growth in the suburban areas surrounding
central cities. Demographers predict that there will be no appreciable change in this
pattern. See generally BOGUE, THE POPULATION OF THE UNITD STATES (1959).
2. See generally DOBRINER, THE SUBURBAN COMMUNITY (1958).
3. Manvel, Trends in Municipal Finances, in THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK, 1963
264, 265.
4. Ibid.
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state or federal subventions. 5 Studies in two diverse metropolitan areas indi-
cate that residential property owners are carrying a major share of the reve-
nue burden. 6 As the property tax by its uniform application makes no distinc-
tion between old and new residents, it is apparent that to the extent that in-
creasing local costs are generated by newcomers to a community, older residents
may be penalized by the newcomers.
The costs generated by new residents may be grouped conveniently into
two classes: capital costs (new streets, sewers, waste disposal plants, schools,
parks, libraries, water mains, and fire and police stations) and service costs
(additional public employees, maintenance, and the like).
Although the disparity in growth rates between various communities is im-
mense, the per capita expense for new capital facilities is strikingly responsive
to population growth. Analysis of municipal expenditures in a typical metro-
politan area, for instance, shows a direct relationship between the growth
rate of a community and its bonding for schools and libraries. 7 And service
S. 7bid.
6. The studies of the New Haven, Connecticut Metropolitan Area and the San
Francisco Bay Area in California are, respectively, QUADRENNIAL REPORTS OF INDEBTED-
NESS, RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF MUNICIPALrrIES 1960 (Conn. Public Doc. #22);
DAVISSON, FINANCING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA (1963).
In the Bay Area 69% of the 1960 revenues were provided locally while 31% came
from state and federal grants-in-aid and shares of state imposed and collected taxes and
license fees. In the New Haven Area 86% of the 1960 revenues were provided locally
while 14% came from state and federal sources. In the Bay Area and New Haven Area,
respectively, 51% and 75% of all local revenues were from property, taxes. These latter
percentages are somewhat higher than the national figures of 49.5% and 44.7% for
1952 and 1961 respectively. See Manvel, supra note 3, at 266. These national percentages,
of course, do not disclose any distinctions which might exist between large central cities
and suburbs.
7. .The following table shows growth rates, per capita school and library bonding,
and per capita locally financed educational expenses in the towns and cities of the New
Haven Standard Metropolitan Area as of 1960. The New Haven SMA is made up of
the towns of Branford, East Haven, Guilford, Hamden, North Haven, Orange, West
Haven, and Woodbridge and the City of New Haven.
Town or City Growth Rate Per Capita School Per Capita Locally
1950-1960 and Library Bonding Financed Educ. Exp.(%) (in dollars) (in dollars)
Orange 181.9 366 91.3
Woodbridge 83.6 379 96.3
East Haven 75.1 131 52.2
North Haven 68.7 299 69
Guilford 55.4 229 69.2
Branford 51.8 166 59.5
Hamden 38.2 141 61.9
West Haven 34.3 81 46.3
New Haven 7.5 70.2 40
Population statistics are from U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, CHARACTERISTICS
OF POPULATION, Vol. 1, pt. 8, at 12. Revenue, bonding, and expenditure data are from
QUADRENNIAL REPORTS OF INDEBTEDNESS, RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF MUNICIPALI-
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charges, at least for some items, tend to increase according to population in
the same way as bonding expenses.8 The revenue burden for services is cast
equitably on new and old residents. The taxes of the old residents have been
paying for a certain number of employees. New employees are added to
service new residents. But the cost of the new employees probably is covered
by the taxes levied on the new residents; hence the burden on older residents
is not affected appreciably unless the newcomers demand increased service
levels. In such case the old residents share equally in the increased levels.
Further, since service charges mount gradually in rough proportion to the
number of new residents, no fiscal "emergency" is normally presented by an
increase in service charges due to new population. Neither of these proposi-
tions is true for capital expenditures. Consider, for instance, the construction
of a new school to house the children of newcomers. If general taxes of the
community are the main source of funds for the new school, either the old
residents pay the whole bill, if land acquisition and construction costs come
out of current revenue, or they pay a good portion of the bill for the additional
school, if, as is usual for school construction, the costs are paid out of receipts
from bonds which will be paid off from future general tax receipts. 9 Moreover,
to the extent that capital improvements are paid out of current revenues
(which is often the case for certain kinds of improvements such as trunk line
sanitary and storm sewers), there is an appreciable drain on revenue re-
sources in a specific year and a fiscal "emergency" is created.
This article deals with the power of a municipality to impose some of the
capital costs generated by newcomers on a subdivider-developer, and thereby
to shift these costs to new residents, by requiring the subdivider-developer
to make various improvements, to dedicate land, or to pay various fees as a
condition of residential subdivision and development. We shall examine the
constitutional limitations on subdivision exactions first, as an exercise of a
municipality's police power and, then, as an exercise of its taxing power.
Finally we shall explore the considerations - fiscal necessity, socio-economic
exclusion, variety in the suburban landscape and adequate levels of service -
which should be taken into account in drafting enabling acts which authorize
exactions.
Requiring newcomers to pay part of their way is not particularly new.
Municipalities, in the twenties and thirties, began to require land developers
to install improvements - especially streets - in order to deter premature
and excessive subdivision and to protect ratepayers from the costs of municipal-
ly installed improvements which remained unused when lots were not sold.10
TIES 1960 (Conn. Public Doc. #22). See also Nash, Financing Local Government: An
Empirical Study of Urban and Suburban Dwellers' Benefits and Burdens (unpublished
paper in Yale Law Library).
8. See "Per Capita Locally Financed Educ. Exp." column in note 7 supra.
9. Of course bonding helps shift some costs to future newcomers.
10. See Reps, Control of Land Su bdivision By Municipal Planning Boards, 40 CORN.
L.Q. 258, 266 (1955).
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Since then the land developer largely has been displaced by the subdivider-
developer who buys raw land, subdivides, improves, builds houses, and sells. 1
Coincidentally the number of municipalities which impose exactions and the
number and type of exactions have increased.12 Most municipalities now re-
quire the subdivider to provide interior streets, sidewalks, and sanitary and
storm sewers. Many municipalities require the subdivider to share the costs
of improvements such as water mains, sewers, and "oversize" facilities. Some
municipalities, by requiring dedication or reservation of sites, or by exhor-
tation, negotiation, or purchase have exacted from the subdivider some con-
tribution to school and recreation costs.
Courts have found no serious constitutional obstacles to subdivision ordi-
nances requiring the installation of interior streets, sidewalks, and sewers.
Recently, however, a number of courts have balked at provisions requiring
land dedications or fees for schools and parks. But few of the old or new
cases are very precise in identifying the constitutional principles which un-
derlie their judgments.
THE POLICE POWER
The Scope of Regulation
In defining the constitutional scope of governmental power to regulate
the use of land, courts have asked, first, whether the conceived purpose of a
regulation comes within the constitutionally acceptable objectives of the police
power: the protection of health, safety and morals, or the general welfare.
Courts have next examined whether the specific exercise of regulatory power
is "reasonable" or whether it exceeds these various limitations on the exercise
of regulatory power.
Before zoning became a familiar means of use regulation, courts treated
land regulations as legislative extensions of common law nuisance principles.
A landowner could be prohibited from carrying on activities which the legis-
lature viewed as unreasonably interfering with the enjoyment of land by
other landowners. Thus, statutes which barred noxious uses in residential
11. See THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, AMERICAN HOUSING 75, 96 (1944); U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, STRUCTURE OF THE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING INDUSTRY IN 1949 (Bull. 1170,
1954) [discussed in BEYER, HOUSING: A FACTUAL ANALYSIS 83 (1958)]; Rogg, Anothcr
Look at Some Factors in Determining Housing Volume, in 1960 PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE
ON SAVINGS AND RESIDENTIAL FINANCING 31, 46-48; and Maisel, Background Information
on Costs of Land for Single Family Housing, in Appendix to GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY CoM-
MISSION ON HOUSING PROBLEMS, REPORT ON HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA 221, 274-75 (April,
1963).
12. TENNESSEE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION, SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENT COSTS:
WHO PAYS FOR WHAT (1958) summarizes studies conducted by the Urban Land Insti-
tute and reported originally in Technical Bull. No. 2 7(1955), by the League of Virginia
Municipalities (1955), the Institute of Public Service of the University of Connecticut
(1955), and its own survey of Tennessee municipalities (1958).
For pre-World War II practices see LAUTNER, SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS Ch. VI
(1941).
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neighborhoods, such as brickyards "3 and stables,14 statutes which prescribed
height limitations to lessen the danger of fire and congestion,' 5 and statutes
which established set-back lines to assure adequate light and air were upheld '6
as valid legislative efforts to proscribe nuisance-like uses. Similarly, the early
cases, including the landmark decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 17 treated zoning as comprehensive regulation to avoid nuisance-like im-
pacts generated by particular uses in particular areas, for instance commercial
establishments in single family dwelling areas.' 8
More recently the permissible objectives of land regulation have been ex-
panded considerably as courts have departed from nuisance analysis and have
relied on the general welfare aim of the police power doctrine. The courts have
thus upheld such regulations as industrial-only zoning 19 and large minimum
acreage zoning.20 The first has been seen as advancing the general welfare by
attracting industry to provide employment and to increase the community's
tax base,-" the second as protecting the character of the community.22 This
expanded conception of valid regulatory objectives results from the fact that
the validity of land regulation is usually treated as a constitutional question
with the normal presumption in such cases in favor of legislative judgments.
With the progression from nuisance (pre-zoning) to nuisance-like (early
zoning) to general welfare (recent zoning), the permissible objectives test,
except as it has been incorporated in the "taking" test, has in most jurisdictions
ceased to be a serious barrier to regulation.
13. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
14. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
15. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
16. Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 Atl. 354 (1920); Lincoln Trust Co. v.
Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241
N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925); Goreib v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
17. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
18. Id. at 387-88. See also Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. Rv.
834, 836, 839 (1924).
19. E.g., People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders v. Village of Morton Grove,
16 Ill. 2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959); State ex rel. Berndt v. Iten, 259 Minn. 77, 106
N.W.2d 366 (1960); Gruber v. Mayor and Tp. Comm. of Raritan Tp., 37 N.J. 1, 186
A.2d 489 (1962).
20. E.g., Senior v. Zoning Commission of Town of New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531,
153 A.2d 415 (1959) (4 acres) ; Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 257, 146 N.E. 2d
35 (1957) (5 acres) ; Flora Realty & Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025,
246 S.W.2d 771 (1952), appeal disivissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1953) (3 acres) ; Fischer v. Bed-
minster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A2d 378 (1952) (5 acres) ; Contra, Christine Bldg.
Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962); Hitchman v. Oakland Tp.
329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951).
21. See cases cited at note 19, supra; and Madsen, Non-Cumnulative Zoning in Illinois,
37 Cmi-KENT L. REv. 108 (1960). Not all courts which have been concerned with ex-
clusive industrial zoning have reacted like the New Jersey, Illinois, and Minnesota
courts. Rather, they have seen as the only permissible objective for such zoning the
protection of the health and safety of the prospective residential occupants in industrial
areas. This is probably a correct characterization of Corthouts v. Town of Newington,
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Courts customarily consider the "reasonableness" of an exercise of regula-
tory power under four rubrics: "arbitrariness," "confiscation," "discrimina-
tion," or "taking." Each represents a cluster of considerations that may be
intertwined in any particular case, but here each will be treated separately.
"Arbitrary" has two meanings. The first, the more conventional one, is that
there is no rational relation between the regulation as applied and the posited
objective.23 The other meaning attributed to "arbitrary" is that the detriment
visited on the landowner subject to the regulation is not outweighed by the
public good realized by its application.2 4 Courts in different jurisdictions tend
to adopt one or the other approach. The first leads to judicial deference to
legislative judgments; the second establishes the courts as ultimate arbiters
in nearly all regulation disputes.
. The "confiscation" limitation assures that however justifiable the objectives
of a regulation, it will not deprive the regulated land of all reasonable value.2r
It represents the furthest boundary of a constitutional balance between in-
dividual property rights and the community's interests in the use of land. As
a minimum, property right means the right to avoid regulation which destroys
140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953) (although the holding was that the zoning was con-
fiscatory because there was no present or foreseeable demand for industrial sites) ; Comer
v. City of Dearborn, 342 Mich. 471, 70 N.W.2d 813 (1955) (although here too industrial
demand was apparently non-existentand there were a number of non-conforming residences
near the subject site) ; Lamb v. City of Monroe, 358 Mich. 136, 99 N.W.2d 566 (1959)
(where the zoning was upheld mainly because the subject site was in the midst of present
industrial uses but also because blight would otherwise occur and demands of home-
owners to ameliorate noise, smoke and the like emanating from the industrial uses would
probably cause undesirable frictions) ; and, perhaps, Roney v. Board of Supervisors, 138
Cal. App. 2d 740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956) (where the court stressed the protection of residents
but also the prevention of blight and the gain realized by a municipality's residents from
the effective use of property for industrial purposes).
22. See cases cited at note 20, supra.
23. Often the inquiry is whether the regulation supports permissible enabling act
objectives, e.g., Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955) and Fanale v.
Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958) where total exclusion
of motels and of apartment houses respectively were found reasonably related to per-
missible objectives. But sometimes the question is whether the exclusion of a specific
use from a zone in which arguably similar uses are permitted is arbitrary. See, e.g.,
Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 118 A.2d 824 (1955) (exclusion of a
commercial use from an industrial zone) ; Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181
A.2d 129 (1962) (exclusion of trailers from an industrial zone in which single-family
houses were permitted) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(exclusion of apartments from a single family residential zone).
24. E.g., Hartung v. Village of Skokie, 22 Ill. 2d 485, 177 N.E. 2d 328 (1961);
Bauske v. City of Des Plaines, 13 Ill. 2d 169, 148 N.E.2d 584 (1957); LaSalle Nat'l
Bank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957) ; Krom v. City of Elmhurst,
8 Ill. 2d 104, 133 N.E.2d 1 (1956). See Babcock, The Illinois Supreme Court and Zoning:
A Study in Uncertainty, 15 U. Ci. L. REv. 87, 88, 93-4 (1947); Babcock, The New
Chicago Zoning Ordinance,'52 Nw.U. L. REV. 174, 175 (1957); Babcock, The Unhappy
State of Zoning Administration il Illinois, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 509, 532-40 (1959).
25. See generally 1 RATHxOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 6-1 to 6-5 (3d ed. 1962).
Usually the objection that a regulation is confiscatory arises in judging the validity of
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the possibility of economic return. The limitation is illustrated by Arverne
Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher,26 where residential-only zoning of land
when there was no readily foreseeable market for such purpose was held
invalid because the owner could make no effective economic use of his prop-
erty in the interim.
The "discrimination" limitation is, at its core, the requirement of the equal
protection of the law. It encompasses general ideas of fairness and equal
treatment and in the context of land use regulation means that similarly situ-
ated landowners may not be treated dissimilarly.27 A typical discrimina-
toin dispute was litigated in Ronda Realty Corp. v. Lawton,2 s where a regula-
tion required apartment house owners to provide off-street parking facilities
but imposed no comparable requirements on the owners of hotels and boarding
houses. The case where a landowner is preferred over his neighbors raises
the same problem. In zoning cases, for example, the court must find that a
a seemingly proper regulation as applied to a specific parcel of property. Often the parcel
is located on a zone boundary and adjoining uses substantially interfere with the per-
mitted use in the subject zone. E.g., Skalko v. City of Sunnyvale, 14 Cal. 2d 213, 93 P.2d
93 (1939) (property zoned residential adjacent to canneries in a bordering industrial
zone); Bassey v. City of Huntington Woods, 344 Mich. 701, 74 N.W.2d 897 (1956)
(property fronting on a heavily traveled highway zoned for single-family residences).
The establishment of minimum frontages and side and rear yards raises similar problems,
e.g., Robyns v. City of Dearborn, 341 Mich. 495, 67 N.W.2d 718 (1954). So also does
physical change, e.g., Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941)
(hurricane damage required extensive sea walls which rendered property uneconomic
for single-family homes).
Loss of value short of nearly total loss normally is held not to render a regulation
confiscatory. See cases cited in RATEKOPF, op. cit. supra at 6-10 to 6-20. But such loss
might lead a court to determine that a specific regulation is arbitrary. See note 23 Vipra.
Occasionally, regulations which prohibit nuisance type activities render worthless
land previously used for such activities but nevertheless are upheld. See, e.g., Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, appeal distissed,
371 U.S. 36 (1962). The decision is criticized in Note, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 896 (1962).
26. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
27. The "equal protection" clause of the 14th amendment secures equality of right
by forbidding arbitrary discrimination between persons similarly circumstanced.
Classification is consistent with this principle if it be reasonably based on the
public policy to be served. It is not necessarily fatal that the classification be wanting
in purely theoretical or scientific uniformity or mathematical nicety or that there
be some inequality in practice. The principle bars invidious discrimination.
It suffices if the classification bears a reasonable and just relation either to the
general object of the legislation as to some substantial consideration of public
policy or convenience or the service of the general welfare. If that be the case,
the action taken is not arbitrary or discriminatory in the invidious sense.
Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 418-19, 422, 88 A.2d 607, 613, 615 (1952)
(citations omitted).
28, 414 Ill. 313, 111 N.E.2d 310 (1953). The evil to be remedied was congested
streets. The court saw no justification in singling out one generator of cars to reduce
the evil while exempting comparable uses which in the court's view probably produced
more traffic congestion.
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zoning amendment is "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" to avoid
invalidation on the grounds of "spot zoning." 29 The role of the courts, with
deference to the legislative judgment, is to determine whether the facts merit
the different classification and the resultant different treatment.
3 0
The "taking" limitation has often been intertwined with the definition of
permissible objectives of regulatory power. It seeks to distinguish between
situations in which regulation is proper and those in which eminent domain
must be used to accomplish the public objective. One of the chief ends sought
is to prevent the costs of use limitations beneficial to the public from being
imposed on landowners simply on the basis of the location of their property.
A typical taking dispute occurred in Vernon Park Realty Co. v. City of
Mount Vernon.3 1 There the municipality zoned for parking use only one
parcel of land which was located downtown and which until that time had
been used as a parking lot. The court held that the public objective - to
reduce traffic congestion - could be accomplished only by eminent domain.
Other examples include a case in which a municipality's beach front, the prop-
erty of one owner, was zoned for recreation purposes only,3 2 a case in which
use and height restrictions were imposed on properties surrounding an airport, 33
and a case in which a municipality designated certain areas for probable ac-
quisition and provided that no compensation would be paid for improvements
erected within three years after the designation. 4
No one definitive theory has been constructed to separate permissible
regulation from prohibited taking. Amidst parallel lines of precedent, how-
ever, four approaches are discernible.
One approach seeks to weigh the disadvantages imposed on the owners of
the regulated land against the advantages flowing to the community from the
regulation. This approach originated in Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon.3 5 It has been characterized by subsequent authorities
29. See 1 RATHxopF, ZONING AND PLANNING (3d ed. 1962) 26-1 to 26-23.
30. The tendency of courts in economic regulation cases as distinguished from civil
rights cases is to read prohibitory effects of the equal protection clause narrowly. See,
e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). But see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
This generalization also applies to land use regulations, see cases cited in 1 RATHROPF,
op. cit. supra, at Ch. 7, although it is clear that the possibility of improper discrimination
by administrators concerns courts which have considered flexible regulatory devices.
See, e.g., Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960) ; Rodgers
v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951) ; Huff v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957).
31. 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
32. McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
33. Compare Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d
559 (1945), with Harrell's Candy Kitchen v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111
So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
34. Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
35. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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as the definitive approach to the regulation-taking problem.3 6 In truth the
approach is but a restatement of the second "arbitrariness" test, and is not very
helpful in those situations in which the taking problem is most acute. In
lount Vernon, for example, the disadvantage to the individual landowner
(the dimunition of the land's value by the restriction to parking uses) cannot
be weighed meaningfully against the gross advantages to the public (the
parking space, the ease of traffic, both at no cost) .3 In fact in Mahon itself
the weighing test was not used to determine whether the challenged regulation
was a taking.38
Another approach avoids the more subtle questions by focussing solely on
the economic uses for a property which are left after regulation. In judge
Fuld's dissent in Mount Vernon, for instance, the question is said to be whether
the regulation "so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose."'3 9 This approach establishes the "confiscation" limitation
as the sole criterion for taking.40
A third approach, the approach of Professor Allison Dunham, is largely
36. This is so often repeated that exhaustive citation is impossible. Typical expo-
sitions of the proposition are contained in Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain -
Poli y and Concept, 42 CALiF. L. REV. 596, 609-10 (1954) ; and Note, 50 CArW. L. REv.
896, 899 (1962). Cf. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
37. For an incisive criticism of the weighing approach as applied in an analagous
area, see Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 769 (1964).
38. The case concerned a statute which forbade mining of coal in such a way as
to cause the subsidence of, among other things, structures used for human habitation,
public buildings, and streets. The court held the statute unconstitutional as it applied
to the mining of coal in places where the right to mine such coal had been reserved.
Holmes, for the Court, addressed himself to two situations: (1) the statute as applied
to protect the home of the individual appellee which was located on land conveyed by
the coal company by a deed which expressly reserved the right to remove all subsurface
coal without liability for attendant damages; (2) the statute as more generally applied
to streets and public building sites where again the right to mine subsurface coal had
been reserved.
Holmes used the "weighing" process only where he treated the situation of the parties.
The question he answered. by its use was whether the limited public interest which the
Court saw in protecting appellee's private house justified the appropriation or destruction
of the appellant's interest in the subsurface coal. This was a typical substantive due process
approach - not one of "taking." He did not analyze in weighing terms when he con-
sidered the validity of the statute as applied to streets and public building sites, but
rather in terms of cost allocation.
For another aspect of Holmes' opinion see note 47 in!ra.
39. Vernon Park Realty Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 501, 121
N.E.2d 517, 521 (1954).
40. This, arguably, is the present approach of the New Jersey courts. Industrial-only
zoning in that state is justifiable in public welfare terms (i.e., increasing tax ratables
and providing employment). See Gruber v. Mayor and Township Comm., 39 N.J. 1,
9-11, 186 A.2d 489, 493-94 (1962); Cf. Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114,
130-32, 118 A.2d 824, 833 (1955) (dissenting opinion). If there is some market for indus-
trial land the regulation is valid. Gruber v. Mayor and Township Comm., supra, at 12,
186 A.2d at 495.
The court in Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Town-
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an inquiry into the objectives of a regulation.4 1 Professor Dunham argues that
while it is consistent with our traditions to prevent someone from using his
property so as to cause harm to the community, by burdening the community
with his own external costs, it is implicit in the just compensation provisions
of our constitutions that the community pay the costs of regulation designed
only to produce community benefits. The distinction, in his words, is between
"compelling an owner without compensation to furnish the beneficial develop-
ment and compelling him to bear the costs of his activity.142 The distinction
between burden and benefit is, however, very difficult to make. While it might
be applied successfully in a case like Mount Vernon, where it could have been
said that the use of the parcel for a commercial building would not be harmful
nor would it create by itself an external cost, the distinction provides no litmus
for most cases. Consider, for instance, height and use limitations imposed on
land surrounding an airport to facilitate the airport's safe operation. Should
such zoning be viewed as preventing harms to the successful operation of the
adjoining land use or should it be viewed as creating a public benefit ?4
Industrial-only zoning is viewed by Dunham as benefit inducing ;44 yet the
cases are nearly unanimous in upholding the device.45 In fact, Dunham's anal-
ysis leads to no sure result in evaluating the host of land regulations, including
setbacks and conventional zoning, which can be conceptualized both as harm
preventing and as benefit inducing.46
A fourth approach, with roots antedating Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., seeks to determine whether the regulation confers on the protest-
ing owner a correlative benefit in terms either of economic return or mutual
ship, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963), held invalid a zoning ordinance which greatly
restricted the use of swamp land in order that it be retained in its natural state as a
flood water basin and a wild life sanctuary, stating that eminent domain was necessary
to accomplish the open space objective. It was not made clear whether regulation was
improper because of the public benefit purpose or because the land was worthless as
regulated. Support for both positions can be found in the court's language.
41. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLumn. L. REv.
650 (1958). See also Dunham, Flood Control via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REv.
1098 (1959) ; Dunham, City Planning: An Analysis of the Content of the Master Plan,
1 J. LAw & EcoN. 170 (1958).
42. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLum. L. REv.
650, 670 (1958).
43. See cases cited in note 33 supra; Note, The Airport and the Land Surroundin.g
It in the Jet Age, 48 Ky. L. REV. 273 (1960).
44. Dunham, supra note 42, at 667.
45. See crises cited in notes 19 and 21 supra.
46. Set back regulations, for instance, while preventing any owner from "harming"
his neighbors' access to light and air and aesthetic sensibilities, also provide communities
with broad ways and the opportunity of more cheaply widening streets. One of the chief
purposes of official map acts is to save money for communities by prohibiting owners
from building in the beds of mapped streets unless they can show appreciable economic
loss flowing from the prohibition. See Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.
2d 198 (1936) ; State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957);
Kucirek and Beuscher, Wisconsin's Oflicial Map Law, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 176.
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amenity.47 If there is no correlative benefit, the regulation constitutes a taking.
This approach accounts for the conventional regulatory devices such as resi-
dential zoning, setbacks, and official maps and also for the newer devices
such as historical zoning and industrial-only zoning. In all but the last each
owner is receiving in return for the restriction imposed on him special amenity
benefits flowing from like regulation of his neighbors. And in industrial-only
zoning each owner will profit, since industrial parks have a higher market
value than scattered industrial sites.
48
The correlative benefit theory, however, suffers from two deficiencies. Its
concern with the private benefits flowing to those regulated rather than
with the benefits to the community at large seems inconsistent with the usual
case analysis of proper regulatory objectives which focuses on public benefits.
Actually, there is no inconsistency because the question to which the corre-
lative benefit analysis is directed is not whether the objective of the regulation
is public and therefore permissible, but whether the regulation is impermissible
because it constitutes a taking. More important, in some cases the correlative
benefit analysis does not focus attention on all the meaningful considerations.
Recently, for example, courts have upheld regulations which seek to control
47. Correlative benefit, then called "average reciprocity of advantage," was the
rationale of several early land use regulation cases. Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,
232 U.S. 531 (1914) (upholding a statute requiring owners of adjoining coal veins to
leave supporting boundary line pillars) ; Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922)
(upholding Pennsylvania's party wall statute).
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the absence of correlative
benefit seems to have been the rationale for holding the regulation a taking. The
City of Scranton had never acquired by eminent domain or initial conveyance the sub-
surface rights in the ground upon which public facilities were built (in other words the
coal barons were there first). The "acquisition" of such rights by regulation constituted
a taking because the public alone benefitted from regulation: there was no "average
reciprocity," as Holmes put it, for the owners. They were regulated quite harshly and,
unlike the regulated owners in Pymouth Coal Co., they got nothing in return. "Average
reciprocity" meant something more to Holmes than the general kind of return (the ad-
vantage of living in a civilized society) that Brandeis in dissent thought sufficient;
it meant some special kind of return not enjoyed by the community at large.
In Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, the district court struck down a
comprehensive zoning ordinance and asserted that the ordinance could not be sustained
on the principle of reciprocity of advantage. 297 Fed. 307, 315-16 (1924) (dictum). Without
explicitly treating reciprocity, the Supreme Court reversed and held the ordinance an
appropriate exercise of the police power, conducive to the general welfare. 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
48. See LOGIE, INDUSTRY IN TowNs 26-51 (1952); KITAGAwA & BOGUE, SUBUR-
BANIZATION OF MANUFACTURING AcTIvITY (1955) ; NELSON & AScHmAN, REAL ESTATE
AND CITY PLANNING 357-59 (1957) ; CHAPIN, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 313 (1957) ;
FUCHS, CHANGES IN THE LOCATION OF MANUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE
1929 93 (1962), for discussion of the efficiency of industrial parks both for the municipality
and for the industry. For a discussion of the benign aesthetics of industrial parks, see
ANDREWS, URBAN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 359 (1962). For the effect of industrial
parks on land values, see generally ISARD, LOCATION AND SPAcE-EcoNomY (1956).
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the timing of urban development. 49 The community benefits from these regu-
lations most concretely by avoiding unnecessary municipal expenses created
by haphazard development. It is difficult, however, to see those landowners
who presently are restricted to low density uses as the recipients of any special
benefit. Nevertheless, the regulation seems wise because the goals are impor-
tant and regulation is the only means to realize them; nor is eminent domain
a feasible alternative in such cases.
Subdivision exactions have been traditionally regarded as a species of reg-
ulation and, thus, subject to the same constitutional limitations as zoning and
other more common forms of land regulation. Arbitrariness and confiscation
raise no serious problems for exactions nor do the Holmes or Fuld taking ap-
proaches. And, as we shall show, properly drawn exaction ordinances are
neither discriminatory nor will they result in takings even under the restrictive
Dunham approach or the correlative benefit test.
Conventional Subdivision Exactions
At the outset there seems to be no justification for avoiding the question
of whether conventional subdivision exactions comport with constitutional
limitations on the exercise of the police power by characterizing subdividing
as a privilege 50 or by asserting that exactions only condition the recordability
of a plat and not the subdivision and development of land.51 If the use of land
is to be regulated and conditioned, the policies underlying our notions of the
proper scope of regulation ought to be faced squarely.
Most land use regulations, exclusive residential and exclusive industrial
zoning, for example, prohibit uses conceived of as creating harms or as im-
pairing the general welfare. Subdivision exactions, however, permit the
desired uses but append affirmative conditions designed to minimize their
impact on others in the community. 52 Before examining the reasonableness
of exactions we must first inquire whether the regulatory object, to minimize
these impacts, is permissible.
The impacts on the municipality to be minimized by such regulatory con-
ditions as the dedication of streets - to consider the most common of the
conventional exactions - clearly fall within the permissible scope of regula-
tion. No court to our knowledge has rejected the validity of objectives such
as convenient access to houses for fire and police protection and rational street
plans to handle traffic adequately.
49. E.g., Josephs v. Town of Clarkstown, 24 Misc. 2d 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1960).
See Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the Urban
Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 370, 392.
50. Cf. Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
See Note, An Analysis of Subdivision Control Legislation, 28 IND. L.J. 544, 557 (1953).
51. Cf. Newton v. American Security Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941).
See Note, Platting, Planning & Protection - A Summary of Subdivision Statutes, 36
N.Y.U.L.REv. 1205, 1213-14 (1961) ; Note, An Analysis of Subdivision Control Legisla-
tion, 28 IND. L.J. 544, 574-86 (Appendix, Item V) (1953).
52. These are similar to minimum acreage zoning requirements which permit resi-
dential use but require spacing to minimize "harms" seen to flow from higher density use.
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The condition posited raises no problem of confiscation or arbitrariness.
The exaction is clearly related to proper objectives and in any but an extra-
ordinary situation would not preclude an economic use of land.
5 3
What of the limitations on discrimination and taking? We assume that
similar street conditions are imposed on all subdividers. This is done fairly
automatically in the case of streets (and other internal improvements, for
example, sewers) where the facilities created are used by the subdivision
residents and fill needs created by them. If the conditions are not similar,
however, there might be a serious equal protection problem. But given equality
of treatment between contemporaneous subdividers, the only possible dis-
crimination is between builders on land subdivided at a time when these
conditions were not imposed and when the community bore the costs of street
acquisition, or at least street improvement, and present builders and their
customers who now must bear these costs alone. But classifying such builders
differently would not be unreasonable under an equal protection test; legisla-
tion must take effect on some day, and hence there would not be proscribable
discrimination.5 4
A taking argument seems to have merit at first glance, for the developer
is being required to dedicate a portion of his land to the community which
then acquires title to the streets. But if the regulation requiring the subdivider
to construct the streets is valid, formal acquisition of title is bereft of impor-
tance. Under such circumstances the developer wants the community to
acquire the streets so as to shift the costs of their continued maintenance and
repair to the community's tax base. Thus the dedication "requirement" is
actually of advantage to the developer, and it has even been suggested that
because of this advantage to the developer he may be required to improve the
streets before the community accepts his proferred dedications.5 This sugges-
tion, however, leaves unanswered the question whether a regulation requiring
the construction of improved streets, as well as a mere dedication requirement,
should be treated as a taking. Certainly the community benefits from having
developers provide streets which are useful to the whole community as well
53. Problems of arbitrariness could arise. if, for instance, streets of unreasonably
large width or unreasonably expensive paving were demanded. Apparently such demands
are occasionally made with the intent of inhibiting development or adding to its expense
in order to prohibit the construction of lower cost housing. See, e.g., Fagin, Financing
Municipal Services in a Metropolitan Region, 19 J. AM. INsTrIr. OF PLANNERS 214 (1953) ;
Wehrly, Are Modern Subdivision Regulations Pricing Moderate Income Groups Out
of the New Housing Market, in PROCEEDINGS: LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONFERENCE ON
StOvsoN CONTROL 14 (1957).
54. E.g., Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923) (legislation
providing compensation for injury from condemnation to businesses previously estab-
lished but not to those established after the date of the legislation upheld in face of equal
protection challenge).
55. See BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS VII-21. The original Model Subdivision
Controls Act saw the withholding of municipal improvement of streets in unapproved
subdivisions as a major tool to enforce subdivision regulations. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A
STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT 6, 18 (1928).
1964] 1131
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
as the residents of the development; yet the community will not need to spend
its own money for their acquisition and initial improvement.
Judicial reaction uniformly has been that the imposition of street dedication
and improvement conditions does not constitute a taking. The courts, how-
ever, have been less than precise in stating why this is true. Nevertheless, in
the two leading cases on the question, Ayres v. City Comicil of Los Angeles rJo
and Brous v. Sviith,57 one judgment is clearly identifiable. It is permissible to
require a landowner to pay for improvements which are generated by his use
of the land whether or not the community is also benefited by the expenditure.58
The California court in Ayres assumed that "the dedication of land to the
widening of existing streets" was "reasonably related to increased traffic and
56. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
57. 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E. 2d 503 (1952).
58. Thus in Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, the California court writes:
It is the petitioner who is seeking to acquire the advantages of lot subdivision
and upon him rests the duty of compliance with reasonable conditions for design,
dedication, improvement and restrictive use of the land so as to conform to the
safety and general welfare of the lot owners in the subdivision and of the public
.... [T]he requirement for the dedication of land to the widening of existing
[boundary] streets was not a compulsory taking for public use; ... it is a condition
reasonably related to increased traffic and other needs of the proposed subdivision
[and] it is voluntary in theory and not contrary to constitutional concepts.
34 Cal. 2d at 42, 207 P.2d at 7-8.
And the New York court's more extensive discussion in Brous v. Smith:
The statute reflects a legislative judgment that the building up of unimproved and
undeveloped areas ought to be accompanied by provision for roads and streets
and other essential facilities to meet the basic needs of the new residents of the
area. "We all know that where subdivision of land is unregulated lots are sold
without paving, water drainage, or sanitary facilities, and then later the community
feels forced to protect the residents and take over the streets and . . . provide for
the facilities." (Bettman, City and Regional Planning Papers (1946), p. 74.) Thus,
the regulations benefit both the consumer, who is protected "in purchasing a build-
ing site with assurance of its usability for a suitable home," and the community
at large, which naturally gains greatly from the use of "sound practices in land
use and development."
Unimproved or defective roads can cause a complete breakdown of services in
a community. The state has a legitimate and real interest in requiring that the
means of access to the new construction be properly improved and sufficient for
the purpose.
But the town ... does not seek to condemn land owned by petitioner. It is pe-
titioner who wishes to construct dwellings on his property, and the town merely
conditions such construction upon his compliance with reasonable conditions
designed for the protection both of the ultimate purchaser of the homes and of
the public. That the state may empower the town to do this is clear. ". . . the
subjection to the police power of all property gives the State the right to forbid
the use of property in the way desired, save under reasonable conditions promoting
the public welfare."
304 N.Y. at 169-70, 106 N.E2d at 506-07.
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other needs of the proposed subdivision."' 9 The New York court in Brous
suggested that it was unfair to force the community to provide streets which
are essential only in light of the basic needs of the new residents. The courts,
in other words, were saying that so long as there is some reasonable relation
between the needs normally generated by a use and the conditions imposed
on the use no taking has occurred. These statements certainly satisfy the
Dunham test approach to taking.60
The correlative benefit approach to taking is also satisfied by the posited
exaction, for the homebuyers are receiving needed streets. To the extent
that they do not pay the costs of the streets, they are getting what amounts
to a gift from the municipality. But as the exactions cover the costs of the
street, an equivalent benefit is obtained, thus obviating questions of taking.
The developer is seen as the collector and rarely will he be unable to collect.,'
Thus, in the conventional exaction context the correlative benefit test and
the Dunham test resolve to much the same thing. Similar analysis supports
the host of other conventional exactions which have been approved by courts.
rhese include exactions for sewers, 2 water mains,63 sidewalks,6
4 and the like.66
59. 34 Cal. 2d at 42, 207 P2d at 7-8. This assumption is quite suspect. Two of the
conditions imposed in Ayres related to the widening and landscaping of a portion of a
boundary highway to which the subdivision had no access. It is difficult to say, therefore,
that the traffic to be generated by the subdivision related to that portion of the highway
which was to be widened. Three related problems arise from this. First, that the con-
dition was arbitrary because there was no relationship between it and the "increased
traffic and other needs of the proposed subdivision," the court's own referrent. If the
purpose of the condition was viewed more broadly, however, for instance the provision
of more adequate roadways for the community's traffic, it would not be arbitrary. But
in the latter case the condition might well be considered a taking because the subdivider
and his customers would be getting nothing in return for the exaction and there would
be no rational nexus between the costs generated and the exaction. Moreover, there
would be serious equal protection problems if this subdivider were required to dedicate
more land than other subdividers simply because of propinquity.
60. Interestingly, the courts make no distinction between developers and their cus-
tomers. The activities of both - construction and occupancy respectively - are seen to
generate the need for additional streets and to permit imposition of the cost. Of course
the exaction is imposed on the developer and the home buyers ultimately pay it only
to the extent that market factors permit its transfer.
61. In a large jurisdicion the market will allow all developers to collect the cost
of exaction. Where many jurisdictions demand the exaction, the developer will be able
to collect. Only in the rare case where one jurisdiction exacts and the many surrounding
jurisdictions do not might the market prevent collection. In that case the developer
will consider the exaction with the many other factors that determine his sale price, and
he may choose to build elsewhere.
62. E.g., Medine v. Burns, 29 Misc. 2d 890, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ; Stanco
v Suozzi, 11 Misc. 2d 784, 171 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; Mefford v. City of Tulare,
102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 228 P2d 847 (1951).
63. E.g., Lake Intervale Homes v. Parsippany Township, 43 N.J. Super. 220, 128 A.2d
300 (1956) ; SE-Frank Developers v. Gibson, 157 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1956), modified,
5 App. Div. 2d 687, 169 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1937); Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9
Wis. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359 (1960).
64. E.g., Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920).
65. E.g., City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1960)
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Newer Subdivision Exactions
Typical of the newer kinds of demanded exactions are land dedications for
school and park sites and fees to be used for the acquisition and improvement
of such sites. The question is whether they should be treated any differently
from the conventional exactions which have received judicial approval.
It would seem clear that the objectives of these exactions are permissible.
They are intended to minimize the overcrowding of existing facilities de-
voted to education and recreation - activities clearly important to the general
welfare of the community. Since there is value left to the property owner
and since the regulation is required to attain the objective, the newer exactions
would also appear to avoid the barriers of confiscation and arbitrariness as
easily as the conventional exactions.
Discrimination and taking limitations, however, are seen to pose a unique
problem. The problem is the same under both rubrics. It is whether the sub-
division homebuyers, who ultimately finance such exactions, will be required
to pay more than a "fair" share for community schools, parks, and other fa-
cilities financed by the exactions. If they are forced to pay more than a fair
share the result arguably is both a taking and discriminatory. Taking occurs
because there is imposed on the homebuyers costs resulting not only from
their own activities but from the activities of the rest of the community. Dis-
crimination flows because such buyers unreasonably are being isolated to
pay costs attributable to other residents as well.
A number of state courts have recently been faced with ordinances which
require land dedications or the payment of fees for school and park purposes.36
In all cases but two the courts found the exactions not authorized by the
applicable enabling act. The courts paid tribute, however, to the presence of
constitutional issues which they did not confront. In the two other cases,
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect 67 and Gulest
(drainage canal) ; Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956)
(curbs and gutters).
66. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957) ; Pioneer
Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799
(1961); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960);
Coronado Development Co. .v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962)
Ridgemont Development Co. v. City of East Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 100 N.W.2d 301
(1960) ; Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d
729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), ajf'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962); Haugen v.
Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
The progeny of Kelber indicate the confused state of the law of exactions. Compare
Wine v. Council of City of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 2 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1960)
(which followed Kelber and held a Los Angeles sewer connection fee unauthorized under
the enabling act), with Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App. 2d
533, 6 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1960) (in which another division of the same district appellate
court distinguished Kelber as applying only to cities created under general law and upheld
the Los Angeles sewer fee as a valid exercise of police power by a charter city).
67. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
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Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburghl s the Illinois and New York enabling
acts, respectively, authorized the exactions,, and the courts held the authoriza-
tion unconstitutional. Different constitutional analyses, however, were stressed
in each case. In Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank, a land exaction for a school
or playground was held invalid because the exaction was not related to the
costs generated by the subdivision. The court seemed to apply the analysis of
the conventional exaction cases, and under that analysis it found the statute
wanting. In Gulest, on the other hand, the court applied a criterion not found
in the conventional cases: it was troubled because there was no requirement
that fee exactions for recreational purposes would be used to construct fa-
cilities directly benefiting the prospective buyers of the subdivision homes.
The Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank case had been preceded in the Illinois
Supreme Court by Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove.69 In Rosen a local
ordinance was applied to require a $325 per lot payment for an "educational
facilities" fund, and the court stated that the theory underlying the enabling
act provisions concerning dedications of streets and public grounds was that
"the developer of a subdivision may be required to assume those costs which
are specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity and which otherwise
would be cast upon the public." Since the fees envisaged in Rosen would not
necessarily be limited to such costs, construing the enabling act to include a
fee authorization would be inconsistent with the act's theoretical underpinning.
Rosen's statement of the theory of the enabling act was elevated to constitu-
tional principle in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank,70 which held invalid an
ordinance which required the dedication for public purposes of one acre per
sixty families. The municipality was demanding 6.7 acres from an intended
250 family subdivision for an elementary school site or a playground. The
applicable enabling act permitted "reasonable rquirements for parks, play-
grounds, school grounds, and other public grounds."' The court held this
exaction unconstitutional repeating the quoted statement from Rosen. The
court approved the distinction, drawn by the California court in Ayres,
72 be-
tween facilities generated by the activity within the subdivision and other fa-
cilities required by the total activity of the community. Recognizing that the
addition of the subdivision would aggravate the existing need for additional
school and recreational facilities, the court stated that it had not been shown
that the needs for recreational and educational facilities underlying the exaction
were "specifically and uniquely attributable" to this intended subdivision so
that the cost "should be cast upon [this] subdivider as his sole financial burden."
On the contrary, the court stated that the present crowding of the village
68. 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d .729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815,
225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962).
69. 19 Ill. 2d 448, 453, 167 N.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1960).
70. 22 Ill. 2d at 379, 176 N.E.2d at 801 (1961).
71. Rev. Cities and Villages Act § 53-2, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24 § 11-12-5 (1961).
72. Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 3b Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). See
note 56 supra.
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school facilities resulted from the total development of the community and
therefore the school problem "is one which the subdivider should not be
obliged to pay the total cost of remedying." 73
The court's statement in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank could mean either
that the school and park shortages which would ensue after occupation of
the development would result not from the new subdivision but from the fact
that the community had already filled existing facilities, or that there was no
formula to relate the potential "needs" of the subdivision for parks and schools
to the fees or land dedications sought to be exacted. The first alternative is
unlikely in view of the Illinois court's stress on protecting the subdivider from
paying the "total cost of remedying" the shortage in facilities. If the first
alternative were intended, the court would have held merely that school and
park exactions are invalid. Rather, the court spoke in terms of imposing the
"total" cost on the subdivider. Even more persuasive, only the second alterna-
tive is consistent with the reasoning of the conventional exaction cases. There
it is evident that the need for improved streets is also caused by the inade-
quacy of existing street facilities, and the provision of new streets benefits
the whole community. It is most likely, then, that the Illinois court was dis-
turbed by the absence of a formula relating need and exaction in order to
avoid discrimination and taking. Modern cost-accounting techniques can
provide adequate formulas to relate need and exaction and thus satisfy the
conventional cost-generation approach of the Illinois court. This will be
explored in detail below.
Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh 74 suggests an alternative
constitutional analysis which departs from the conventional police power
analysis. The Gulest court would prohibit exactions unless they result in fa-
cilities which directly benefit the subdivision to which they are related. In
Gulest the Appellate Division affirmed a lower court decision holding uncon-
stitutional an enabling act providing that if it is not feasible to locate a park
within a subdivision, the planning board "nay require" in lieu of land dedi-
cation the -payment of fees "which ... shall be available for use by the town
for neighborhood park, playground or recreation purposes including the ac-
quisition of property."75 The court found that the planning board's apparently
unlimited discretion to levy or not levy a fee charge raised an equal protection
problem, and that the phrase "recreation purposes" was unconstitutionally
vague. But the court was also concerned that the fees were not limited to
uses for the benefit of the residents of the particular subdivision - the
fees could even be spent before the subdivision was completed.
In a recent article Reps and Smith have formulated the direct benefit
analysis suggested in Gulest.76 If the improvements financed by the exactions
73. 22 111. 2d at 381-82, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
74. 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd 15 App. Div. 2d 815,
225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962).
75. N.Y. TowN LA-,w § 277 (emphasis added).
76. Reps and Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRAcusE L. REv. 405
(1963). Cf. Doebele, Improved State Enabling Legislation for the Nineteen-Sixties: New
Proposals for the State of New Mexico, 2 NATURAL RES. J. 321, 339-42 (1962).
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are not located so that their benefit inures exclusively to the homeowners in
the subdivision itself or if they are not of a type which could be financed by
a peculiar kind of tax, the special assessment, they are unconstitutional. This
formulation leads them to draw a distinction between streets, sewers, and
neighborhood parks on the one hand and school buildings, police and fire
stations, and various sanitation facilities on the other. Exactions for the
former are valid, for the latter unconstitutional.
Three arguments, none of which seem sound, are advanced for this de-
parture from the usual police power analysis found in the conventional exac-
tion cases. The more usual police power test, it is argued, is not strict enough
because "positive exactions" rather than "negative prohibitions" are involved.77
But while exaction conditions imposed by subdivision regulations might seem
superficially more like "takings of private property without compensation"
than prohibitions on use, the actual cost of a zoning regulation to an owner
in any specific case might easily be higher. For instance, restricting property
fronting on an intersection of two busy streets to residential uses 78 or excluding
a residential subdivision 79 or a trailer park so from an industrially zoned area
might well deprive an owner of more value than requiring a subdivider to
construct roads or to pay fees in lieu of dedications for parks and schools,
fees which he will normally pass on to consumers who often are receiving
governmental subsidies in the form of guaranteed loans. There seems no
ground for distinguishing constitutionally a "positive exaction" and a negative
regulation of use. Either, neither, or both can be discriminatory or a taking
in any specific case.
Reps and Smith's second argument is directed to that part of their formu-
lation which requires that the benefits of the exaction inure exclusively to
the subdivision. Two statements are made in its support: ". . . it is equally
self-evident that an individual who purchases a house within a subdivision
should bear no more than his proportionate share of governmental ex-
pense ... ;" and, "There can be no justification for placing upon ... future
homeowners the costs of benefits which will inure to the general public." 8'
The two-fold concern here, which also exists under conventional regulatory
analysis, does not require so draconian a doctrine. First, given a proper cost-
accounting approach it is possible to determine the costs generated by new
residents and thus to avoid charging the newcomers more than a proportionate
share. Second, the conventional zoning and subdivision cases hold that it is
immaterial that a subdivision exaction also would inure to the benefit of the
public so long as there is a rational nexus between the exaction and the
:osts generated by the creation of the subdivision.
77. Reps and Smith, supra note 76, at 407.
78. E.g., Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958).
79. E.g., Gruber v. Mayor and Township Comm. 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962);
tate ex rel Berndt v. Iten, 259 Minn. 77, 106 N.W.2d 366 (1960).
80. E.g., Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
81. Reps and Smith, supra note 76, at 409.
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Reps and Smith's third argument is directed to the other part of their for-
mulation which would bar exactions used to finance improvements not of a
type which, in their view, could be financed by special assessments. They say
that ". . . public school buildings and fire stations have generally been thought
to be so much a responsibility of the general public that such financing
[special assessment] was not available. '8 2 Thus they argue that constitutional
considerations, presumably limitations against discrimination and taking, pro-
hibit one from viewing education, fire, and police expenses which arise from
the influx of new people to new residential developments as costs to be im-
posed on such people regardless of the formula devised to ascertain how
much of the increased cost is generated by their presence. They cite a Michigan
case, Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 3 and dictum in a New Jersey case,
Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Town of Madison,8 4 in support of these propo-
sitions.
Merrelli struck down a fee schedule for building permits designed to shift
a portion of the municipal expenses arising from building activity (street
maintenance and fire and police protection) to the home builders. The court
in Merrelli relied heavily on a New Jersey decision also concerned with build-
ing permit fees, Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant.8 5 There the court held
that a city could not raise revenue for school costs and other services under
its police power. However, the court then added that such income could be
raised if the power were properly delegated by the legislature.
Both Merrelli and Daniels involve the powers granted to municipalities
by state statutory and constitutional provisions, not due process and equal
protection limitations on the exercise of governmental powers. The inquiry
was whether the municipalities had requisite authorization to impose the fees.
This is evident in New Jersey where the Daniels case was one of a series
construing unique New Jersey statutes authorizing license fees for mixed
tax and regulatory purposes.88 And in Merrelli the court found that the
problems addressed in the ordinance "are the public problems of the com-
munity and the expenses incurred in their solution are to be defrayed (absent
valid legislation otherwise providing) from the general revenues of the
city... "s
82. Id. at 410. An understandably similar point of view has been advanced by the
National Association of Homehuilders, RYAN & MCDONALD, LEGAL PPOBLEixs OF LAND
SuBDvsMON 27-29 (1960).
83. 355 Mich. 575, 96 N.V.2d 144 (1959). They also cite University Custom Houses,
Inc. v. Township of Redford, 355 Mich. 606, 96 N.W.2d 151 (1959), a companion case
to Merrelli.
84. 68 N.J. Super. 197, 209-10, 172 A.2d 40, 47 (1961), aff'd without opinion. 78 N.J.
Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1963).
85. 23 N.J. 357, 362, 129 A.2d 265, 267-68 (1957).
86. See Gilbert v. Town of Irvington, 20 N.J. 432, 120 A.2d 114 (1956); Bellington
v. Township of East Windsor, 17 NJ. 558, 112 A.2d 268 (1955) ; Weiner v. Borough of
Stratford, 15 N.J. 295, 104 A.2d 659 (1954) ; Salomon v. Jersey City, 12 N.J. 379, 97
A.2d 405 (1953).
87. 355 Mich. at 586, 96 N.W.2d at 149 (emphasis added).
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There is the hint of a constitutional issue in a statement in Merrelli restrict-
ing money raised pursuant to the police power to the amount necessary to
defray the cost of regulation. 8 But here too it is important to note that the
court was speaking about the police power in the sense of authority vested
in municipalities and not in the constitutional sense of limitations on the
exercise of governmental power already properly vested in municipalities.
Other service and construction charges unrelated to the cost of regulation
have been upheld under the police power where municipal authorization
was clear."" It would seem, moreover, only sophistry to make a constitu-
tional distinction between ordinances requiring the improvement of streets
(conceded to be proper regulation in Michigan) 90 and ordinances requiring
the payment of fees in lieu of street improvements (allegedly improper under
a contrary interpretation of Merrelli). The Merrelli court is saying that in
Michigan, as elsewhere, the authorization of municipalities to exercise police
power is not read as expansively as due process and equal protection consid-
erations would permit."1
The dictum in Midtown Properties is not so easily explained as Merrelli.
Midtown raises a policy issue concerning the police power, an issue which
might lead a court to adopt the direct benefit test:
It is the duty of the municipality to educate our citizenry; to build
schools, and equip and maintain them for such purposes. The cost for
public education, in a democratic society, must be borne by the public
and the funds to be used for such purpose must be raised by public tax-
ation.
It is my opinion that any attempt to compel a developer to pay for
building a school, or to donate land for a school, as a condition precedent
to giving . . . approval to a subdivision is violative of his constitutional
rights .... 2
88. The police power may not be used as a subterfuge to enact and enforce what
is in reality a revenue raising device .... The indirect costs, as well (as the direct
costs], of administering and enforcing the police regulation are recoverable, but
they must in fact be such . . . costs, as distinguished from the costs of expanded
government services, and they must be established by reasonably accurate ac-
counting procedures ....
355 Mich. at 588, 96 NAV.2d at 150.
89. City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 308 P.2d 1 (1957) (garbage fee
imposed whether or not payee utilized municipal garbage services and upheld under both
the police and taxing powers) ; Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App.
2d 533, 6 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1960) ($400 per acre sewer outlet charge as a condition for sub-
division permission) ; Stanco v. Suozzi, 11 Misc. 2d 784, 171 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1958)
($500 per building sewer fee for building permit).
90. Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
91. Cf. 4 COOLEY, TAXATION § 1680 (4th ed. 1924) ; 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TION LAW §§ 5.01-5.03, 6.00 (1963). In fact, 4 COOLEY § 1680 is cited in the penultimate
paragraph of A!errelli, 355 Mich. at 558, 96 N.W.2d at 150.
92. Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 209-10,
172 A.2d 40, 47 (1961), aff'd without opinion, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (App.
Div. 1963).
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In support the court cited Township of Springfield v. Bensley,9 3 which held
that a municipality could not prohibit a building project because the local
school system could not absorb the projected increase of students, and the
Rosen and Gulest cases from Illinois and New York respectively. 4 These
authorities are unpersuasive. The Bensley holding has since been overruled
by Gruber v. Mayor and Township Comm.,95 and the Rosen and Gulest cases
are clearly distinguishable.9 6
However unpersuasive the authorities, the Midtown dictum clearly illus-
trates the policy considerations at stake. It is inconsistent with democratic
principles, the judge implies, to impose on parents any special charges for
the education of their children; public schools must be funded completely
from a general tax base.97 What is feared, apparently, is the erosion of a free
educational system and the growth in its stead of a system in which the quality
of education depends on tuition-like charges and in which those who cannot
pay the fee are excluded. Though the argument evokes sympathetic responses,
it is unrealistic as a constitutional proposition, for it looks only at individual
communities and ignores the fact that different communities spend varying
93. 19 N.J. Super. 147, 88 A.2d 271 (Ch. Div. 1952).
94. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960);
Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729, aff'd,
15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962).
95. 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962). In the Bensley case the Township sought the
revocation of a building permit issued one and one-half years before urging that the de-
fendant was constructing more apartments than originally planned. The applicable
zoning ordinance did not control the number of apartments in multiple unit buildings,
but rather relied on area ratios to limit densities. Nevertheless, the Township argued
that it was threatened with additional burdens to its school and sewer sanitation systems.
Hypothesizing that the Township's factual representations were correct, the court stated:
The inadequacy of facilities presently available in a neighborhood cannot support
the objection to a building project otherwise permissible under the zoning ordi-
nance and the building code. It is the duty of the municipal authorities to supply
all such facilities as the town grows and expands in population and as the need
for increased facilities arises .... [Tihe court is not concerned with the economics
involved in the performance of the duty resting on the municipal authorities to
furnish required facilities as and when and to the extent needed. The duty is para-
mount.
19 N.J. Super. 147, 158, 88 A.2d 271, 277 (Ch. Div. 1952). Similar holdings are found in
other New Jersey cases including Ridgefield Terrace Realty Co. v. Borough of Ridgefield,
136 N.J.L. 311, 55 A.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; and De Mott Homes, Inc. v. Margate City,
136 N.J.L. 330, 56 A.2d 423 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 136 N.J.L. 639, 57 A.2d 388 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1948).
The Gruber case rejected the premise of this line of authority by legitimating as ob-
jectives the attraction of industry and the exclusion of residential subdivision in order
to enhance municipal tax bases and minimize drains on municipal resources. See Note,
16 RUTGERS L. REV. 469 (1962).
96. See text at notes 70-75 supra.
97. Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 209-10,
172 A.2d 40, 47 (1961), aff'd without opinion, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (App.
Div. 1963).
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amounts of money for educational purposes.9s The result is tuition-like differ-
ences in school taxes from municipality to municipality. State sponsored tax
equalization programs and state payments to local districts for educational
expenses tend to equalize the level of services somewhat, but such programs
only mitigate previously gross differences. The Midtown dictum is undesirable
as well, for it precludes all legislative balancing of such values as minimizing
the impacts on older residents of tax costs generated by rapid suburban growth
and providing a source of needed revenue both to service newcomers and to
protect from dilution the quality of present services.
In sum, the Reps and Smith direct benefit-special assessment analysis is
rejected for two reasons: First, there is no justification for courts to veto
on constitutional grounds a legislative determination that new residents ought
to be subjected to the payment of increased municipal costs attributable to
their presence. While some might disagree with the wisdom of the legislative
decision, it is far from arbitrary and unreasonable, especially when it is real-
ized that such a determination seeks to protect older residents from what
might well be conceived as unjust tax rises and provides another source of
needed municipal revenue. Second, no justification appears for perceiving a
constitutional dividing line between statutes which permit one kind of cost
to be imposed (for instance, street improvements) and not another (for
instance, educational facilities) as long as a method exists for relating costs
and exaction. If such a method is sound both the Dunham and correlative
benefit taking tests are satisfied, for it is not unreasonable to see subdivision
development as generating the need for a variety of facilities and buyers as
receiving the use of their facilities in return for the exactions ultimately im-
posed upon them. Similarly, a method of relating generated costs to the exaction
solves the problems of discrimination.
Cost-Accounting
Modern cost-accounting technique is the method available to relate cost
and exaction in order to avoid questions of discrimination and taking.99
Assuming that developers will pass on the costs of exactions to their cus-
tomers, an equal protection and taking analysis involves examination of two
sets of relationships - that between new residents in different subdivisions,
98. Net current expenses per pupil for the school year 1961-62 for the towns and
city in the New Haven Standard Metropolitan area, see note 7 supra, were as follows:
Woodbridge, $534; Orange, $488; New Haven, $470; North Haven, $452; Hamden, $442;
Guilford, $430; Branford, $394; West Haven, $383; East Haven, $320. CONNECTICUT
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE COUNCIL, LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOL EXPENSES AND STATE AID IN
CONNECTICUT SCHOOL YEARS 1957-58 THROUGH 1961-62 (1963).
99. On cost-accounting generally, see MATZ, CURRY & FRANK, COST ACCOUNTING
(1952) and SOLOMON, STUDIES IN COSTING (1952). On municipal cost-accounting, see
DUE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1959) and TENNER, MUNICIPAL
& GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING (1955). For an early and suggestive work on municipal
cost-accounting, see STEPHAN, POSSIBILITIES OF THE USE OF COST ACCOUNTING IN PUBLIC
BUDGET MAKING (1939).
The following studies apply cost-accounting techniques to particular municipal ex-
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and that between new residents in subdivision developments and all other
residents. In order to assure equal treatment between residents of different
subdivisions similar exactions should be imposed on all. This is done fairly
automatically with conventional exactions because each subdivision must pro-
vide internal facilities in relationship to the specific needs of each. A require-
ment such as land dedication for schools, however, poses a more difficult
problem. To avoid discrimination all developers should be required to make
dedications for this purpose according to criteria which will result in equal
treatment. But it is normally impossible to demand such dedications from
small developers whose subdivisions will not conceivably generate the need
for an entire school and whose locations often will be quite inconvenient for
such a facility. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to establish criteria for land
dedications which result in equal treatment. A number of contemporary ordi-
nances seek a specific percentage of the development's total area. When such
a standard applies across the board there is no showing that resultant acreage
is at all related to the school needs generated by the subdivisions. As noted,
the criterion which determines the extent of the exaction in the case of interior
streets is need: each subdivision is "automatically required to provide interior
streets necessary to handle the traffic generated by it." There is no necessary
relationship, however, between the total acreage of the development and the
school needs which will be generated by it. A development with numerous
homes on small lots will impose a much greater educational burden than a
development with fewer homes on larger lots. Thus a percentage of total
acreage is not necessarily a rational measure (or classifying principle) to
determine the extent of the dedication exaction. 100 Indeed, this lack of ne-
cessary relationship was one of the problems perceived in the Pioneer Trust
& Savings Bank case. 101
The exaction of fees for school purposes in lieu of land dedications is a
more flexible device and permits of equal application to all subdivisions re-
gardless of size. The fee, however, must be calculated in accordance with a
standard which has relevance to its purpose. The police power purpose is
need, and thus a sound fee schedule demands an estimate of school population
penditures. BALDWIN & MARCUS, LIBRARY COSTS AND BUDGETS (1941) ; HARRIS, INSTITU-
TIONAL COST ACCOUNTING (1944) (hospitals); WHEATON & SCHUSSHEIM, THE COST OF
MUNICIPAL SERVICES IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS (1955); ISARD & COUGHLIN, MUNICIPAL
COSTS AND REVENUES RESULTING FROM COMMUNITY GROWTH (1957) ; NATIONAL CoWr.
ON URBAN TRANSP., COST ACCOUNTING FOR STREETS AND HIGHWAYS (1959).
100. There are other, more salient, measures. For school facilities, e.g., the number of
school age children; for convenience this may be calculated on an average children per
house, number of houses basis. See note 99 supra. This does not mean that a percentage
of total acreage dedication is irrational. It may well be that the unplated land exacted
can be valued and, in translation, will approximate the money exaction justified by cost-
accounting.
101. There lurks in the opinion, of course, a suggestion that the Illinois court fears
there is no rational way to measure and attribute school costs to a subdiviison. Pioneer
Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380-81, 176 N.E.2d
799, 802 (1961). See text following note 73 supra.
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to be generated by the subdivision and the cost of providing facilities for
such a population.
This analysis applies to a variety of facilities: parks, schools, fire sta-
tions, and the like. Modern cost-accounting techniques permit precise cal-
culation of costs for various facilities allocable to new subdivisions. The total
cost can then be calculated, and fees, in lieu of land dedications or reservations
or of the provision of improvements, can be exacted according to a formula
applicable to all, thus achieving equality of treatment among all new sub-
division residents.
More difficult questions are posed in assuring equal treatment between
new subdivision residents and all other residents. Reps and Smith's special
assessment approach seeks to proscribe exactions for so-called community
facilities. They are worried, in part, about imposing on new residents more
than their proportionate share of governmental expense. This is a justified
concern; but proscribing exactions entirely is not justified simply because
under some circumstances some exactions would result in inequity. Rather,
one should seek a way to limit exactions to avoid a disproportionate burden
on anyone. Four relevant classes of persons are to be considered in exploring
whether subdivision residents, upon whom these exactions might fall, will be
forced to bear a disproportionate share of governmental expenses: old resi-
dents and those who will buy from them in the future; future buyers of
houses in the subdivisions subjected to the exactions; future buyers of future
subdivisions; and residents of new rental housing. It is convenient to explore
these relationships in the context of exaction fees for school purposes - aware
of course that the same analysis applies to a variety of facilities.
Suppose a subdivision development of 400 houses. Available data indicate
that in a development of this type each house will contain an average of two
children or a total of 800, 600 of whom will be in elementary school at some
time and 400 of whom will be in high school at some time. Available informa-
tion permits quite accurate calculation of the capital expenditures necessary
to house this population in schools.10 2 The calculation indicates an expenditure
of $1.4S million. Federal and state subventions, hypothetically, will cover
some 31 percent of this cost leaving approximately $1 million to be charged
to the community. Is it proper to impose this whole cost on the subdivision,
or will that result in discriminating against the buyers of homes in the de-
velopment?
102. The now well developed techniques of cost-accounting are designed to summarize
the costs incurred to accomplish a particular purpose and to apportion them on some
relevant unit basis. Using these techniques three operations are necessary to calculate
the amount of permissible exactions: estimation of the new facilities made necessary by
the influx of people; estimation of the cost of the facilities; apportionment of the cost
among the subdivision units. Thus for schools, for example, the process would be: What
square footage increase of classroom space is necessary to accommodate the increase in
the school age population? How much will it cost? Apportioning the cost on the basis
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It might be said that this does result in discrimination in favor of old resi-
dents who will be relieved from a portion of their property tax burden which
would be allocable to pay the service charges on bonds issued to build the
facilities made necessary by the subdivision. But if the already filled facilities
have been paid for by a prior property tax, there is no reason to see the old
residents as getting an unjustified benefit except to the rather minimal
extent that the undeveloped subdivision property contributed to that property
tax revenue. If, on the other hand, the existing schools are not yet paid for
and the property tax on the developed subdivision will help pay for them,
the old residents are passing some of the costs of existing facilities to the
new residents while avoiding the costs of the new facilities. Discrimination
can be avoided, however, by reducing the amount of the exaction by the dis-
counted amount of the old school costs to be paid by the property tax on
the houses in the new subdivision. This, of course, assumes that the new
subdivision is required to finance all the expenses of new schools. This would
be rare. To the extent that the old residents through the property tax pay
a portion of the expenses for new facilities, the new residents through the
same tax could be required to pay the costs of the existing facilities.
Those who in the future will buy or rent the houses of old residents will
not have to bear the kind of exaction presently being imposed on new sub-
division residents. Does this result in unconstitutional discrimination against
the latter group? We believe it does not and that it is proper to see such
future buyers in the place of the old residents thus assuring to the old resi-
of the average number of children per house, what will be the cost per house? That is
the permissible exaction.
The following is a model cost accounting of school facilities for exactions. Suppose
a subdivision of 400 houses. Eight hundred children are added to the population by the
subdivision (IsARD & COUGHLIN, op. cit. supra note 99 at 51) [hereinafter cited as I. & C.].
Suppose 600 will be in elementary school at some one time and 400, in high school at
another one time. The following calculations are indicated.
Elementary School High School
$ 13.10 per square foot (I.&C. 73) $ 15.60 per square foot (L&C. 73)
x85 square feet per child (I.&C. 64) x125 square feet per child (I.&C. 64)
$1113.50 per child $1950.00 per child
x600 children x400 children
$668,100 cost $780,000 cost
$1,448,100 total cost
-448,911 (31% federal-state subvention - California average)
$ 999,189 total local cost
$ 460,989 for the elementary school
$ 538,200 for the high school
(Land costs have not been included in this accounting because-they are so highly variable
from place to place. In any given case, however, .it would be possible to estimate land
costs as well. For the amount of land required for various sized schools, see I.&C. 64).
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dents sales prices for their homes which are not lessened by the necessity
of buyers paying a special school fee. We presume that such a fee would act
to depress the market value of the old homes by an equivalent amount and
would result in the old owners thereby having to pay for the new schools, as
well as the schools previously funded by their property tax.
It might be argued that future buyers of homes in the development presently
subjected to exactions are being preferred to the present buyers who are re-
quired to bear the exaction if the latter are required to pay for schools which
will outlast the specific educational needs generated by them. For instance,
the elementary and high school facilities constructed with the hypothetical
$1 million will still be operating after the children of the initial subdivision
buyers have graduated. We do not see this as discriminatory because future
sales prices of homes in the subject development ought to reflect at least part
of the exaction. Nevertheless, it is possible to account for this factor and
avoid a potential question of discrimination by charging to the subdivision
buyers only that portion of cost allocable to the average use which would be
made by the estimated children initially to be housed in the subdivision. Thus;
returning to our model, less than one-third the cost of both the elementary
and high school facilities would be reflected in the school fee, or some $.29
million. 10 3 This would result in an upper limitation of $730 per house, which
amortized over a twenty year period at six percent would be $62.76 per house
per year. Such result should not discriminate against future buyers of homes
in the development because they will not be paying additional specific charges
for the capital facilities which they occupy but will only be contributing to
their cost through the general property tax applicable to all within the juris-
diction. Moreover, it is probable that market forces under such circumstances
would minimize the extent to which the original (partial) exaction could be
transferred.
As far as residents of future subdivisions are concerned, there is no dis-
crimination, for the same exaction schedule will apply to them.
The remaining question involves possible discrimination in favor of or
against new residents in multiple rental dwellings. The exaction schedule
103. Assume twenty years of life for a school (I.&C. 86). The 600 subdivision ele-
mentary school children will use it for eight years, 215 of its life. The 400 subdivision
high chool children will use it for four years, 115 of its life. The cost of the school fa-
cilities attributable to them is:
$184,396 for the elementary school
107,640 for the high school
$292,036 total
This cost exacted over 400 houses is $730 per house. To recapitulate, of the cost of the
required school facilities:
$292,036 will be paid by exactions.
$707,153 will be paid by the municipality.
$448,911 will be paid by state and federal subventions.
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could be applied to single parcel rental dwellings. And in fact, it is even
possible that a court would require the inclusion of new apartment dwellings
in any exaction schedule, especially in suburban communities, on the ground
that there is no responsible basis for distinguishing between new single family
houses and new apartment houses when considering the objectives of a school
(or other) exaction regulation.10 4
Cost-accounting provides a method for calculating capital costs generated
by subdivision development. While accountants will undoubtedly differ con-
cerning the propriety of specific cost allocations, rational resolutions of such
disputes ought to satisfy courts that constitutional taking and discrimination
limitations have not been transgressed. Moreover, for reasons to be explored
in the last section of this article, we believe that state statutory exaction limits
would normally be set well below the sum which would create the more
difficult equal protection and taking issues. 10 5 In the absence of such statutory
limits, however, a community would be wise to establish upper limits far
enough below the absolute cost of facilities required by the development so as
to appear reasonable on their face and cast the difficult burden on protestors
to show that the exactions are discriminatory.
THE TAX POWER
Exactions may also be regarded as a species of taxation. Whether an ex-
action is characterized by the courts as a tax or a police power regulation
depends upon the clarity of the enabling act and upon the terms in which
the ordinance is drawn.10 6 Special assessment and the excise tax have been
urged as appropriate analogies for exactions. 10 7 For these reasons, and because
taxation might serve as the appropriate rubric for recasting exaction legisla-
tion, it is important to examine what constitutional room there is for a system
of exactions based squarely on the taking power.
Special Assessment
Special assessment in the usual case is based on the tax power, albeit a
peculiarly qualified tax power.108 Special assessment doctrine is usually
thought to require that the cost assessed to a particular property owner for
an improvement must be reflected in an increase in the fair market value of
104. More complex questions will arise where new apartments are constructed on
cleared land, normally within central cities. Here discrimination could be avoided by
calculating the fee on the basis of net residential units added by the new construction.
105. See text following note 168, infra.
106. See notes 86-87 supra and 149-50 infra and accompanying text.
107. Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Sitbdivision, 14 S.RACUs L. REv. 405
(1963) (special assessment); Doebele, Improved State Enabling Legislation for the
Nineteen-Sixties, 2 NATURAL Rs. J. 321 (1962) (excise tax).
108. 1 PAGE & JONES, TAXATION BY AsSESSMENT § 8 (1909) ; 14 McQUn.UN, Muni-
ciPAL CoaR1oAmoNs § 38.01 (3d ed. 1950); RHYNE, MUNICIrPAL LAW § 29 (1957); 2
ANTIEAU, MuNIcIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 14.00 (1963) [hereinafter these standard
treatises shall be cited by the author's name].
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the property.10 9 Thus, special assessment is not like the usual exercise of the
tax power:
... when taxation takes money for the public use, the taxpayer receives,
or is supposed to receive, his just compensation in the protection which
government affords to life, liberty and property, in the public conveniences
which it provides, and in the increase in the value of possessions which
comes from the use to which the government applies the money raised
by the tax; and these benefits amply support the individual burden." 0
Special assessment is not content with this diffuse and imprecise compensation.
Because of a particular sensitivity to problems of police power regulation and
property taking, sensitivities long since muted in other uses of the taxing
power, the special assessment must be compensated by benefit and, more
important, benefit must be measured by an increase in the value of the prop-
erty assessed. This special property benefit requirement is justified in such
terms as ". . . without reference to benefits, it would either take property
for the public good, without compensation, or it would take property from
one person for the direct benefit of another,""' or "the owner has received
a peculiar benefit, which the citizens do not share in common," 1 2 and it is
therefore "equitable ... to charge [him] ... with a greater proportional part
of the -cost of the work.""13 Because of this special requirement the special
assessment is not bound by state constitutional requirements or uniformity
and ad valorem taxation or by limitations on the amount of taxation.114
However strict this doctrinal requirement that a special assessment be
offset by an increase in property value, the courts have developed a counter
doctrine of deferment to legislative judgments that the benefit to property
is present. The result is the practical demise of the property benefit require-
ment. In French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.," 5 the Supreme Court
announced the federal rule that legislative determination is conclusive of the
question whether and how much the property assessed is benefited. This
was the summation of many previous cases and has been followed again and
again by the Court."06 It has come to be the accepted state rule."1 7 The courts
109. 1 PAGE & JONES § 11; 14 McQurLLI N § 38.02; RHYNE § 29-2; 2 ANTIEAU
§ 14.01.
110. 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIo AL LihuTATioNs 1055 (1927).
111. Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 189, 30 Am. Rep. 289, 294 (1878).
112. Marion Bond Co. v. Johnson, 29 Ind. App. 294, 297, 64 N.E. 626, 627 (1902).
113. City of Boston v. Boston & Albany R.R., 170 Mass. 95, 98, 49 N.E. 95 (1898).
114. 1 PAGE & JONES § 34; 14 McQuiLLiN § 38.05; 2 ANTIEAU § 14.00. A state enab-
ling act is, of course, required.
115. 181 U.S. 324 (1901).
116. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1904)
(legislative determination conclusive); Embree v. Kansas City & Liberty Blvd. Road
Dist., 240 U.S. 242 (1916) (determination by delegated commission, with hearing, con-
clusive) ; Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Dist., 306 U.S. 459 (1939) (implied legislative
determination in creation of special assessment district conclusive).
117. See, e.g., Flynn v. Chiappari, 191 Cal. 139; 215 Pac. 682 (1923) ; Duling Bros.
Co. v. City of Huntingdon, 120 W. Va. 85, 196 S.E. 552 (1938).
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have allowed a host of methods for apportioning the assessment, all equally
acceptable as approximations of property benefit." 8 To buttress further their
deference to legislative determinations of benefit, the courts have held that
the benefit need not be reflected in the present property value, rather any benefit
in any possible future change in the use of the property will do. 119 Thus, as
one commentator puts it, absent fraud or gross unreason a special assessment
will not be struck down for lack of property benefit,120 and the absence of
property benefit will fail as a defense to collection or as a ground for attack
on the assessment.121 The result is a host of valid special assessments that
exceed the actual benefit to the property assessed. 22
Contrary to Reps and Smith's assertion, special assessment embodies no
categorical spatial requirement. 123 The distance of property from an improve-
ment does not itself preclude the legislature from subjecting it to special
assessment. Special assessment for paving a non-abutting intersection has
been upheld. 24 Similarly, assessments for widening a street a block away 125
118. See, e.g., Tonowanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389 (1901) (foot frontage) ; Quale v.
City of Willmar, 223 Minn.'51, 25 N.W.2d 699 (1946) (foot frontage) ;'Appeal of Hazel-
tine, 23 N.J. Super. 154, 92 A.2d 530 (1952) (square foot); Turner v. Adams, 178 Ark.
67, 10 S.W.2d 41 (1928) (property value).
119. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430
(1904) ; Appeal of Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 18 N.J. Super 357, 87 A.2d 344 (1952) ;
Howard Park Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 119 Cal. App. 2d 515, 259 P.2d 977 (1953).
120. Biuvs, ADAIINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 77 (1963). See also
14 MCQUILLIN § 38.02; RHYNE § 29-8 and 2 ANTIEAU §§ 14.07-14.13.
121. BuRnus, op. cit. supra note 120, at 82, 89-90.
122. Mount Saint Mary's Cemetery Ass'n v. Mullens, 248 U.S. 501 (1919) (assess-
ment for sewer where property was used for a cemetery) ; Howard Park Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 119 Cal. App. 2d 515, 259 P.2d 977 (1953) (assessment for sewer where
property was used for oil production) ; Quale v. City of Willmar, 223 Minn. 51, 25
N.W.2d 699 (1946) (assessed for water main on fronting avenue where water main on rear
avenue already serviced residence and grounds) ; Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. City of Seward,
166 Neb. 123, 131, 88 N.W.2d 175, 181 (1958) ("It is probably true that too large an
amount of the costs of the improvements ... were assessed to the owners . . "') ; Appeal
of Hazeltine, 23 N.J. Super. 154, 92 A.2d 530 (1952) (assessed for enlarged storm water
system outlet where even if water overflowed it would not overflow on the land assessed) ;
Appeal of Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 18 N.J. Super. 357, 87 A.2d 344 (1952) (assess-
ment for sewer where the nine acres assessed were fully occupied by outdoor electrical
apparatus and equipment, where a statute restricted the sale of utility property to other
public utilities, and Where the land was serviced by an existing sewer) ; Beasley v. Moores-
town Township, 3 N.J. Super. 535, 67 A.2d 334 (1949) (assessment for sewer on fronting
street where sewer on rear street already services the property and where the property
was not connected with the new sewer) ; Shalet v. City Comm'n, 62 N.M. 55, 304 P.2d
578 (1956) (assessment for street paving where property was used for a cemetery and
where one assessor testified.that paving would not enhance the land value and another
testified that paving would depend on its future use).
See generally WINTER, THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT TODAY 18-19 (1952).
123. Reps & Smith supra note 107, at 411.
124. Faver v. Washington, 159 Ga. 568, 126 S.E. 464 (1925).
125. Inhabitants of Plainfield v. Cleary, 11 N.J. Misc. 922, 168 Atl. 628 (Sup. Ct.
1933), aff'd, 113 N.J.L. 35, 172 AtI. 565 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
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and two-thirds "of a mile away 126 and for laying out a park three-quarters
of a mile away - 7 have been upheld. Distance from an improvement may be
evidence going to the question of benefit, but the crucial question, in doctrine
at least, remains the question of benefit. 1 2
Similarly, contrary to Reps and Smith, special assessment embodies no
qualitative restriction. They assert that while streets, sewers, and parks
may be financed by special assessment, public schools and municipal services
may not be.129 This may be so as a matter of custom, but there is nothing
in the theory of special assessment to make it necessary. The commentators
commonly rely on two nineteenth century cases for the proposition that
public schools may not be subjects of special assessment. 130 The cases do
not support the proposition. Vanover v. Davis 13 held simply that the Justices
of Terrill County, while they had power from the legislature to select sites
for public buildings, had no authority to assess taxes. The case gives no
indication that the attempted taxation was in any way special; rather it ap-
pears to have been general and county wide. Board of Conm'rs of Public
Schools v. County Comm'rs,132 on the other hand, upheld a Maryland act
granting authority to tax for public schools. The act applied only to Allegheny
County and had been attacked as special legislation. There is no indication
that special assessment was contemplated; rather, a general school tax seems
to have been at issue. A more recent case, McCoy v. City of Sisterville,"3
holds that municipal fire protection may be financed by special assessment.
McCoy suggests that to the extent that municipal services are used by prop-
erty owners, and where such use is reflected in the market value of the
property, they may be financed by special assessment. There is good reason
to expect that to whatever extent the construction of schools or any im-
provement meets the McCoy conditions, it can be subject to special assess-
ment. Since, as Dean Jefferson B. Fordham notes,134 the courts are finding
126. Mock v. City of Muncie, 9 Ind. App. 536, 37 N.E. 281 (1894).
127. Hart v. City of Omaha, 74 Neb. 836, 105 N.W. 546 (1905).
128. Holmes v. City of Harvey, 324 Ill. 336, 155 N.E. 335 (1927). See generally
RHYNE §§ 29-3, 29-4.
129. Reps & Smith, supra note 107, at 409.
130. See 14 McQtuiLLIN § 38.29; RHYNE § 29-3.
131. 28 Ga. 354 (1859).
132. 20 Md. 449 (1864).
133. 120 W. Va. 471, 199 S.E. 260 (1938). 14 McQuImLIN § 38.29 and RHYNE § 29-3
both cite cases to the effect that special assessment may not be used to finance public
buildings or public services. Again, the cases do not prove out. County of Adams v. City
of Quincy, 130 Ill. 566, 22 N.E. 624 (1889) holds only that a court house may be assessed
specially for the cost of paving streets in front of it. County of McLean v. City of Bloom-
ington, 106 Ill. 209 (1883) is to the same effect. Trephagen v. City of South Omaha, 69
Neb. 577, 96 N.W. 248 (1903), holds 'only that the enabling act did not authorize special
assessment for garbage colletcion. The court raised no question about the power of the
legislature to authorize such an assessment.
134. FORDHAm, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 452 (1949). Among the cases cited by Ford-
ham, see City of Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 2d 664, 151 P.2d 5 (1944) (upholding special
1964] 1149
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the theory of special assessment considerably more open ended than had
been supposed, customary notions of what improvements are properly sub-
ject to special assessment are in for revision.
A further question might well be raised: why maintain in special assess-
ment the by now ephemeral requirement that the assessment be no greater
than the increase in property value? Suppose there were to be substituted
for the property benefit rule the cost-accounting analysis suggested here
for exactions? Certainly the popular conception of special assessment is more
closely approximated by a cost-accounting approach.
The owner, usually, has little concern with any theoretical economic
benefit which may accrue to his property from the improvement. If the
improvement is worth its cost to him from the services aspect, he is
content.1
3 5
This conception, closely linking the special assessment with the service charge,
dominates local legislatures and very often influences state legislatures and
the courts.136 It may be wise explicitly to acknowledge this fact in special
assessment theory.
In the earliest statutory provision for special assessment there seems to
have-been no requirement of property benefit. The assessment originated in
the drainage of Rumney Marsh in the County of Kent. The statutory re-
sponse provided for the construction of sewers and drains; their cost was
to be charged to those profited by the new pasture and by the better fishing.1 37
A later statutory effort required adjoining property holders - owners and
inhabitants - to build new streets and to keep them in repair, all without
regard to special property benefit.13 8 The property benefit requirement seems
to have crept into special assessment doctrine in the course of the colonial
effort to transplant the old law to the new world. In the nineteenth century
courts became tied to the notion that the property benefit had to be measurable
in terms of a rise in the market value of the benefited property.139 More
recently, however, old notions of real property as the exclusive residence
of value have altered considerably. It is now recognized that a property owner
may receive value in services which is not necessarily reflected in the value
of his property. And cost-accounting would seem a most appropriate means
of gauging this less tangible value in the form of services.
Despite the fact that cost-accounting theory most closely approximates
the popular view of special assessment and more clearly measures the relevant
assessment for the construction of public parking places). To the same effect, see Am-
bassador Management Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 296 N.Y. 666, 69
N.E.2d 819 (1946), cert. denied. 330 U.S. 835 (1947).
135. WINTEa, op. cit. supra note 122, at 20.
136. Id. at 18.
137. 23 Hen. 8 c.5 (1531). See 1 PAGE & JONES § 23.
138. 2 W.&M., c.8, § 7 (1690).
139. For the history of special assessment, see 1 PAGE & JONES §§ 11, 23-31. See also
Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146, 157 (1870) (Justice Read dissenting to a strict
property benefit decision and arguing from the history to permissive benefit requirements).
1150 [Vol. 73 :1119
INCREASED COMMUNITY COSTS
considerations of value, it may be that courts continue to choose the property
benefit theory because of some suspicion that property values, and changes
in them, are more easily measured and traced than are the costs of community
services. But it is hardly necessary to look beyond the confusion and the
deference of courts to legislative judgment in special assessment cases to
see this proposition belied.1 40
The property benefit requirement protects the special assessment from
state constitutional requirements of uniformity and ad valorem taxation and
exempts the assessment from limitations on the property tax rate. But there
is no reason to suppose that such exemption would be sacrificed by a reformu-
lation of special assessment in cost-accounting terms. The cost-accounting
assessment would still be distinguished from general property taxation. In-
deed it would bear a striking resemblance to municipal service charges which
are exempt from the various state constitutional restrictions and, like service
charges, the cost benefit assessment would not allow an unreasonable charge. 41
Thus, for example, the sort of assessment illustrated by Nakinma Realty Co.
v. City of Milwaukee 142 - the sort that the traditional special assessment
rule is designed to protect against - would be invalid under the cost-ac-
counting rule. There widening a street and constructing a bridge linking
Milwaukee with its major suburbs across a nearby river resulted in an
assessment of $11,400 against a nearby property owner. The sale price of
the property after the improvement was $3,000. Clearly the assessed tax
was not reflected in the property's fair market value. The assessment was
struck down. Cost-accounting assimilated to special assessment would offer
similar protection. It was not the activities of the Nakima Realty Co. but
the activities of the whole city which produced the $11,400 bill.
If the property benefit rule has any function not served better by a cost-
accounting analysis, it is recovering to the public from property owners
whatever increase in the value of their property accrues from public improve-
ments. In this function the special assessment represents one of the few efforts,
however imprecise and indirect, to effect Henry George's program. It is,
however, a most inadequate effort. Very often special assessment stops well
short of recovering the full value produced by public improvements. It may
be more realistic to restrict the special assessment to a financing function, and
then, if we choose to follow George's banner, to refine a more precise in-
strument to recover for the public treasury the value produced by public
improvements.143
Both the traditional formulation of special assessment theory and the cost-
accounting formulation go to matters of equal protection and taking - that
140. In contrast, see the abundant literature on cost-accounting cited at note 99 supra.
141. RHYNE § 20-5; 2 ANTIEAU § 19.03, at pp. 634-35.
142. 249 Wis. 355, 24 N.W.2d 610 (1946).
143. For a review of recent legislation attempting to realize the single tax, see Brown-




the assessed owner should not bear an unfair burden, that he should not
bear the cost of his streets and those of others as well, that he should receive
some benefit from the assessment. It is the merit of Reps and Smith that
they recognize these as the crucial questions for the constitutionality of exac-
tions. It was this consideration that led them to adapt special assessment
to exactions. But special assessment is not the only tool adequate to the task.
Indeed special assessment is more than Reps and Smith thought it was.
Where it departs from their conception it does not prejudice equal protection,
for even though there are no spatial or qualitative limitations, the traditional
property benefit theory assures some minimal equality. Equal protection and
the prohibition from taking are arguably jeopardized, however, by the prac-
tice of judicial deference to legislative judgments on property benefit. The
cost-accounting rule would give the courts a more accurate tool for analyzing
both benefits and cost allocation whether the rubric were assessments or ex-
actions.
Excise Taxes
Professor Doebele suggests that exactions be recast as excise taxes with
but one qualifying hesitation: subdivision may not be a business that is sub-
ject to such a tax. 4 4 This hesitation seems inappropriate; there is no quali-
tative limit on the sorts of businesses on which an excise tax can be levied.0
Indeed, the usual state constitution speaks in terms of the power to tax "any
occupation, trade or business.' 46 Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit 147
points to the possibility of an excise tax on subdividing. More recent cases
make the matter even more clear. In City of Los Angeles v. Rancho Homes,
Inc. the application of an excise tax on "any person doing business as an
independent contractor or realtor" to the subdivider was upheld.' 48 In striking
down a fifty dollar per lot fee for parks, recreation, and fire protection as a
regulatory device in conflict with the Subdivision Map Act, the California
court in Newport Building Corp. v. City of Santa Ana 149 noted that if the
ordinance had been worded to cover the whole operation of subdivision -
improvement, construction and sales - it would have been upheld as an
excise tax. In an even more pregnant decision, the California court, in City
of Glendale v. Trondsen,1 0 upheld a tax for rubbish collection upon building
144. Doeble, Improved State Enabling Legislation for the Nin teen-Sixties. 2 NA-
TURAL RES. J. 321, 341-42, n.67 (1962).
145. See 4 COOLEY, TAXATION §§ 1679, 1680 (4th ed. 1924) [hereinafter cited as
COOLEY]; 16 McQuILLIN §§ 44.190d, 44.191; RHYNE § 28-13. An early Kentucky case,
Hager v. Walker, 128 Ky. 1, 107 S.W. 254 (1908), had struck down an excise tax on
real estate agents on the sole ground that it failed to take account of the volume of business.
146. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
1026-27 (1959).
147. 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
148. 40 Cal. 2d 764, 256 P.2d 305 (1953) (an excise tax of tvelve dollars for the
first twelve thousand dollars of gross receipts and one dollar on every thousand thereafter).
149. 26 Cal. Rep. 797, 210 Cal. App. 2d .771 (1962).
150. 48 Cal. 2d 93, 308 P.2d 1 (1957).
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occupants, qua occupants, as a direct cost of service under the police power
or, alternatively, as an excise tax on the right of occupancy.'0 '
If the business of subdividing may be subject to a tax, what are the con-
stitutional limits on the tax? Excise taxes are grounded upon the usual
rationale for the taxing power - the diffuse benefits flowing to taxpayers.0 2
Where license fees rest upon the police power, they are limited by police
power doctrine. But where revenue is the purpose of a license fee, it is an
excise tax and there is no such limitation ;153 indeed, constitutional limita-
tions on the excise tax are permissive.1 4 Enabling legislation is necessary,05
but the excise tax is not subject to state constitutional requirements of uni-
formity,'"0 ad valorem taxation,0 7 or to tax rate limitations.0 8 The tax must,
however, be reasonable. In constitutional terms the tax may be neither con-
fiscatory nor discriminatory. Thus if the tax is so great as to prohibit a legiti-
mate activity it will be struck down as confiscatory, 59 and if it is not based
upon reasonable distinctions germane to the revenue purpose, it will be held
invalid as discriminatory.
160
As in the other areas of the law of exactions a crucial question is the discrimi-
nation doctrine. The most recent Supreme Court treatment of classification for
taxation purposes, Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,162 is generous in
its dicta that state discrimination between residents and non-residents does
not render a classification arbitrary if the classification is founded upon a
reasonable distinction grounded in state policy. This case, however, is only
of uncertain relevance to the subdivision problem. In Allied Stores the Court
upheld an Ohio statute exempting non-residents from an excise tax on mer-
chandise stored in a warehouse. The classification was held justified by the
state's policy of encouraging new industry to locate in the state. In an earlier
decision in the same general line of cases, General American Tank Car Corp.
v. Day,1 2 the Court upheld an excise tax imposed upon non-residents in lieu
of local property taxes. If an excise tax is regarded as bearing upon the new
residents of the subdivision, hitherto non-residents, the situation can be trans-
151. For an excise tax on the right of occupancy, see also 16 McQUiLLIN § 44.190d;
RHYNE § 28-13.
152. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
153. 4 COOLEY § 1787.
154. 4 COOLEY § 1802; RHYNE § 28-13.
155. 4 COOLEY §§ 1676, 1680; 16 McQUILLIN § 44.190a; RHYNE § 28-9.
156. 4 COOLEY § 1681; 16 McQurLLIm § 44.19; RHYNE § 28-9.
157. 4 COOLEY § 1682.
158. 16 McQuILLIm § 44.29.
159. See, e.g., Bessemer Theaters, Inc. v. City of Bessemer, 261 Ala. 632, 75 So. 2d
651 (1954). See generally 4 COOLEY § 1809.
160. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Tannahill, 105 Cal. App. 2d 541, 233 P.2d 671
(1951); Panama City v. Hi-Octane Terminal Co., 121 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1960). See gen-
erally, 1 COOLEY §§ 348-53; 16 McQuLL N § 44.190b.
161. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
162. 270 U.S. 367 (1926).
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lated into Day's terms - the excise tax can be viewed as in lieu of the prop-
erty taxes that would have been paid had the new residents been long-time
residents. It may well be, however, that the courts will not look beyond the
subdivider, the direct subject of the taxes, to the residents to whom the tax
will be passed. While excise taxes on other businesses are just as surely
passed on to their customers, the courts' review of the classification usually
stops with the classification of the businesses. 163
Given the variety of municipal circumstances and the contending fiscal
considerations, there is good reason to suppose, as the court indicated in
Bowers, that the construction of a formula for differentiating the relevant
classes for taxation is a legislative job. If the legislature thinks it wise to
apportion the cost of increased facilities to new residents whose activities
make them necessary, whether for reasons of fairness, efficiency, or con-
venience, such a policy, unless palpably arbitrary, should not be liable to
constitutional invalidation. And the cost-accounting analysis offers here,
as in special assessments, a minimum standard by which the courts may
judge the reasonableness of the legislative classification.
CONCLUSION
A Comparison of Police and Taxing Powers
Analysis of subdivision exactions under the police and tax power doctrines
indicates notable similarities. The objectives of regulation, special assess-
ment, and excise tax are differently stated to be protection of the general
welfare, recompense for the benefits of public improvements, and generation
of revenue to provide public facilities and services. Yet the constitutional
limitations on the use of these powers by local governments flow from com-
mon bases. Regulation cannot validly discriminate between similarly situated
landowners and cannot validly place a heavy "uncompensated" cost for public
welfare on landowners without running afoul of equal protection and taking
limitations. Special assessments must be levied, if at all, on all similarly situ-
ated landowners and must bear some relationship to benefits flowing from
the improvements to those assessed. Locally imposed excise taxes must not
be discriminatory; they must be imposed consistently with reasonable dis-
tinctions; and they must not prohibit a legitimate activity. The equal pro-
tection theme runs throughout. The taking theme patently is applicable to
regulations and special assessments (external costs can be collected or ob-
ligations can be imposed so long as specific correlative benefits are created).
While there seems to be no comparable taking limitation on excise taxes,
unless taking considerations are seen to be satisfied by the sharing in diffused
benefits flowing from general public expenditures, nonetheless there is an
upper limit which protects the individual taxpayer from confiscation.
The reason why the regulatory and taxing powers are more often regarded
163. See the cases collected in HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNATENT 45-56
(1961). See also 3 ANTiEAU § 21.12; RH~YNE §§ 28-3, 28-4.
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as disparate rather than as akin is because these powers are normally exer-
cised in different manners: regulation prohibits and taxation exacts. The
inquiry usually is whether state enabling acts permit the exercise of a power
specified as regulatory or taxing. But when their exercise is similar, as in
subdivision exactions, and when the phraseology of specific enabling acts
are not consulted, the similarity of the powers becomes more obvious. Re-
gardless of label, properly constituted exactions for a wide variety of pur-
poses are constitutionally permissible.
A4 Legislative Approach
Subdivision exactions, justified under the police or taxing powers, or
both, often raise desperately needed municipal revenues. They "shift" a
portion of the costs of growth to newcomers in the suburban community,
thereby minimizing to some degree the tax impacts of such growth on the
community's existing residents. But such exactions raise the spectre of ex-
clusion: arguably they will add so to the cost of suburban housing as to
exclude an even larger portion of lower income and non-white population
than is presently relegated to life in the central cities by the higher suburban
housing costs.
A legislature considering enabling statutes for subdivision regulation ought
to examine with care the exclusionary impact of any such legislation. In
our view, well drawn legislation can accommodate exaction without exclusion.
The following considerations are especially relevant. Subdivision housing
is by its nature exclusionary. Many communities are made up primarily of
houses in price ranges in excess of the financial capacities of a large propor-
tion of the population .1 4 Income level exclusion (and to a large extent con-
comitant racial exclusion) has already occurred, and modest additional price
increments are inconsequential. If the goal of diminishing the exclusive
character of such communities were adopted, prohibiting exactions would
have little effect. More to the point would be limiting municipal power to
enact exclusionary zoning, vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination legis-
lation applicable to single family housing, and more effective governmental
subsidization of house buying. Further, many communities for a variety of
reasons will decide against the use of exactions for fear of dampening resi-
dential development deemed desirable to provide, for instance, more con-
sumers for downtown retailers or to attract industry by assuring adequate
residential facilities for employees.
Finally, for the balance of communities where modest houses are permitted,
the impact of exactions will be strikingly slight because legislative and ju-
dicial pressures will tend to require the establishment of reasonable ceilings.
The amount of the exactions at issue in the subdivision cases to date -
164. The average construction cost of single-family houses in the United States in
1962 was $14,325. H.H.F.A., Housing statistics (Annual Data 1963) table A-3. The
average rose to $14,925 in 1963. H.H.F.A., Housing statistics (April 1964) table A-3.
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$37.50 per lot,165 $50 per lot,166 $80 per lot,167 $325 per lot 1611 - can surely
not be characterized as exclusionary. Regarded either as lump sum fees or,
more pertinently, as amortized over the life of a mortgage such sums can
only be minimal in effect. Nevertheless it is true that cost-accounting as a
constitutional test may permit exactions that will significantly increase the
price of the house. In the cost-accounting of a school offered earlier in an
example, a thirty-one percent subvention by federal and state governments
was subtracted from the cost allocable to the subdivision. Such a subvention
is gratuitous and may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction *and from time
to time, severely increasing the allocable cost. Moreover, in a given circum-
stance there may be some ambiguity not resolved by the cost-accounting test;
it may be unclear, for example, how many of the eight hundred children will
attend school at any one time.
There are, however, political pressures that would prevent any state
legislature from permitting exactions to approach the constitutional maximum.
Measures authorizing exactions will come under the scrutiny of powerful
lobbies which are opposed to their passage. The National Association of Home
Builders, for instance, can be counted on to develop the case against such
measures and to urge at the least modest authorized ceilings on the amounts
which a municipality may exact. Further, legislatures should perceive that
courts may well respond negatively to a large exaction either by finding that
it is unreasonable as an excise tax or by invoking the doctrine of reasonable
exercise of the police power. While the courts' primary role in judging ex-
actions should be to assure that new residents do not bear disproportionately
large shares of municipal costs, the legislation of modest ceilings on author-
ized exactions will in effect create a presumption that the exactions are legiti-
mate. Coincidentally, the establishment of such ceilings will minimize the
exclusionary tendencies which might flow from exactions.
There are at least three ways to approach the setting of ceilings. One is to
establish absolute ceiling amounts applicable to all housing development -
for instance no more than $500 per dwelling unit. The exaction still would
have to be based on a cost nexus and all developers would have to be treated
165. Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
166. Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d
729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 538 (1962); Kelber v.
City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957) ($30 per lot school fee;
$99.07 per acre drainage fee).
167. Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App. 2d 533, 6 Cal. Rptr.
900 (1960) ($400 per acre).
168. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
Among the exactions not translated into monetary terms were those in Pioneer Trust
& Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961)
(6.7 acres of land in 250 unit subdivision) ; Coronado Development Co. v. City of Mc-
Pherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962) (10% of the appraised value of the unplatted
land); Wine v. Council of City of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 12 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1960) ($1315 per acre, i.e., $263 per lot, plus the cost of certain streets).
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similarly, but only an exaction of less than $500 would be authorized. A second
is to key the ceiling to the cost of the housing. Such a system would be valid
if all ceilings fell within the constitutional cost accounting limits and the
percentage ceilings were regarded as a legislative effort to assure that the
exaction did not deleteriously increase the cost of the house. A third approach
would more carefully attempt to balance municipal need and solicitude for
existing residents against exclusionary tendencies by relating the amount
of permissible exactions (within constitutional limits) to the community's
tax base. Where municipal resources are already hard pressed, it seems es-
pecially justifiable to shift a part of the cost of necessary new services to the
incomers who make them necessary. To aid such municipalities an exaction
scale could be keyed to effective property tax rates. Communities with effective
tax rates above the state average would be able to impose heavier exactions
than communities whose rates were light. Such a scaling would tend to favor
communities with high service levels and communities which contain a less
than average proportion of high value properties. This is not unreasonable
since the legislative task is to balance municipal need and an equitable tax
burden on old residents against possible exclusionary tendencies.16 9
A Final Word
We have chosen to challenge the emerging rule that would prohibit exac-
tions for a full range of municipal capital expenditures, particularly for schools
and recreation. It seems important to us to free so imprecise and trouble-
some an area as municipal finance, haunted so often by necessity, from in-
flexible constitutional strictures. In an ideal world the problems of muni-
cipal finance would be met more surely and just as fairly by some system
more thorough than subdivision exaction. In the meantime, municipalities
must meet the demands of the day as best they can, finding a few hundred
thousand dollars here and there, wherever they can. So long as our sense of
fairness is not seriously affronted - and exactions of the sort we have dis-
cussed here fall well within that limit - municipalities must be left to find
their salvation.
169. The final question is, when shall the exaction be imposed. For reasons of con-
venience and notice it is appropriate that the subdivider assume the obligation when he
files the subdivision plat and permission to subdivide is granted. To relieve the subdivider
of the necessity of additional early financing, the exaction fee should be collectible not
on the filing date but on the date of sale.
19641 1157
